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Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain: 
What Digital Copyright Can Learn from Antitrust 
Timothy K. Armstrong 
Abstract 
This article, written for the inaugural volume of the University of 
Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, explores the 
disconnect between contemporary United States intellectual property law 
and the often quite different consensus views of disinterested expert 
opinion. Questions concerning how copyright law treats the public domain 
(that is, uncopyrighted material) supply a lens for comparing the law as it 
stands with the law as scholars have suggested it should be. The ultimate 
goal is to understand why a quarter century of predominantly critical 
scholarship on intellectual property seems to have exerted such limited 
influence on Congress and the courts. Comparing recent copyright history 
with the dramatic shift in federal antitrust law that occurred during the last 
four decades in response to academic criticism from the law-and-
economics movement, this article asks whether today’s would-be 
copyright reformers have anything to learn from the transformation of 
antitrust law. 
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The fact is that no other . . . statute has been subjected to so steady a 
barrage of hostile commentary . . . Indeed, the scholarly and professional 
literature on the statute resembles a cascade of vituperation. 
—Robert H. Bork1 
I. Introduction 
Judge Bork was talking about the Robinson-Patman Act,2 not the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).3 Nevertheless, Bork’s palpable frustration that Congress has suffered 
such ill-conceived legislation to exist surely resonates with many contemporary copyright 
scholars. A rich copyright literature has emerged over the last generation that emphasizes the 
importance of enforcing reasonable limits on copyright’s exclusive rights in order to spur 
creative output and foster technological innovation. Copyright scholars could be forgiven for 
asking, however, whether anyone is listening. Judges have said they find little value in academic 
writings.4 The courts have issued decisions that simply fail to engage with the relevant research.5 
And frustration over the inability to alter the frame of the debate has driven one of its best-
known scholars, Professor Lawrence Lessig, from the copyright field entirely.6 
                                                                    
1 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 385 (1978). Although most 
widely remembered today for his failed nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987, the late Judge Bork was for many 
years a scholar of antitrust law, whose The Antitrust Paradox is rightly regarded as a seminal work in the field. See 
William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust 
Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413 (1990), reprinted in EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST POLICY FROM JOHNSON TO BUSH 
275 (Robert F. Himmelberg, ed., 1994). 
2 Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a–13b). 
3 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in relevant part at 
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205). 
4 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). On the other hand, other judges believe that locating pertinent sources in the scholarly 
literature is indispensable to sound decision-making. See John Minor Wisdom, Wisdom’s Idiosyncrasies, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1273, 1278 (2000) (recommending that judges and law clerks proactively seek out law review articles on point). 
5 See infra notes 275–302 and accompanying text. 
6 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST xii–xiii (2011). In 2008, copyright expert William Patry, author of 
the Patry on Copyright treatise, made a similar point when he announced the end of his popular copyright blog: 
I regard myself as a centrist. I believe very much that in proper doses copyright is 
essential for certain classes of works, especially commercial movies, commercial sound 
recordings, and commercial books, the core copyright industries . . . . But in my view, … 
we are well past the healthy dose stage and into the serious illness stage . . . . [T]hings are 
getting worse, not better . . . . [T]he most important stories are too often ones that involve 
initiatives that are, in my opinion, seriously harmful to the public interest. I cannot 
continue to be so negative, so often. Being so negative, while deserved on the merits, 
gives a distorted perspective of my centrist views, and is emotionally a downer. 
3
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In antitrust law, however, Judge Bork and his compatriots conquered the world. What 
began as an insurgent intellectual movement challenging a reigning orthodoxy spread outwards 
from the University of Chicago until it ultimately displaced the incumbent legal regime. This 
recent transformation of antitrust law in response to earlier academic criticism may supply a 
template for today’s would-be copyright reformers. At the very least, comparing some of the 
attributes of a law reform movement that was, on its own terms, successful (whatever one’s view 
of the merits of the resulting legal regime) with the attributes of a reform movement that has so 
far struggled to produce a lasting impact on policy may yield useful insights for transformative 
legal projects across a variety of subject matter domains. 
Part II of this article considers the profound reorientation of United States antitrust law 
along the lines sketched out by commentators affiliated with the so-called “Chicago School” of 
law and economic analysis. The article examines how the Chicago School’s academic critique of 
existing legal rules began to influence, and ultimately to displace, those very rules. The Chicago 
School’s influence is easily traced through a series of court decisions showing the gradual 
acceptance of arguments based on principles of neoclassical microeconomics. 
In Part III, the terrain shifts from antitrust law to copyright law and the time frame 
advances by few decades. The article summarizes, in broad terms, a related family of criticisms 
of copyright law that took root in the legal academy and elsewhere in the mid-1990s, primarily in 
response to perceived legislative and judicial overreach. The sketch of this critical copyright 
literature, and the reform movement that it produced, is necessarily incomplete due to the 
ongoing nature of the reform efforts, the lack of political or organizational cohesion among many 
of the persons most prominently identified with the movement, and the diversity of opinion both 
as to the most salient problems and the contours of proposed solutions. 
Part IV continues by assessing the record of copyright reformist arguments in the courts 
to date. The contrast with antitrust is an unhappy one. In case after case, reformist arguments 
have been rebuffed or simply ignored. To be sure, the story is not uniformly bad for would-be 
copyright reformers; glimmers of more hospitable judicial attitudes appear from time to time and 
statements supporting reformist policy have occasionally emerged from unlikely quarters. But on 
the whole, the record is discouraging. 
Part V seeks to connect the discussions in the preceding sections by asking what 
conditions underlay the earlier transformation of antitrust law and whether it is possible to 
borrow and replicate some of those conditions to transform digital copyright law. The goal here 
is not exhaustively to catalog the necessary measures that copyright reformers might embrace, 
but only to suggest possible directions for further conversation and advocacy. 
                                                                    
William Patry, End of the Blog (Aug. 1, 2008), at http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/08/end-of-blog.html. 
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II. Origins and Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine 
Federal antitrust policy7 in the United States rests upon a series of extremely terse 
statutes. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act8 outlaws “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations[.]”9 Section 2 of the same statute forbids “monopoliz[ing], or 
attempt[ing] to monopolize, or combin[ing] or conspir[ing] with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of” interstate or foreign commerce.10 Section 7 of the Clayton Act11 forbids 
corporate mergers and acquisitions “where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, 
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a 
monopoly.”12 And the Federal Trade Commission Act13 declares “unfair methods of competition 
in or affecting commerce, and unfair acts or practices in or affecting commerce” to be 
unlawful.14 In consequence of the breadth, generality, and brevity of the governing statutes, 
virtually the entirety of substantive United States antitrust law is judge-made,15 its contours 
shaped by the ebb and flow of judicial thinking over time. 
The 1960s and ensuing decades witnessed a transformation in antitrust law driven by 
changes in judicial attitudes rather than statutory revision. These changes in judicial doctrine, in 
turn, were influenced by changes in academic thinking about economic regulation in general and 
                                                                    
7 Largely for historical reasons, the body of law universally known elsewhere as “competition law” is 
referred to as “antitrust” in the United States. See, e.g., RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: 
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW (rev. ed. 1996). 
8 An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 
(1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7). 
9 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
10 Id. § 2. 
11 An act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes, ch. 
323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27). 
12 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). Although as originally enacted this provision of the Clayton Act forbade only 
anticompetitive mergers via stock acquisition, Congress later expanded its scope to include anticompetitive 
acquisition of another firm’s assets as well. See Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). 
13 An act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to define its powers and duties, and for other purposes, ch. 
311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58). 
14 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
15 For students not versed in antitrust principles, the best analogy may be to copyright law’s fair use doctrine, 
which places a minimum of statutory scaffolding, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), under a highly complex set of judge-
made tests and rules; the primary difference being that antitrust law relies equally on judge-made rules to define 
what conduct constitutes an antitrust violation in the first instance, not merely what conduct may constitute a 
defense to liability. 
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competition policy in particular.16 Without attempting to catalog exhaustively the changes in 
antitrust doctrine over the last few decades, it is worthwhile at least to trace the broadest outlines 
of the path the law has charted. 
Almost since the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has recognized that not 
every restraint of trade threatens the harm that prompted Congress to act. Virtually from its 
inception, therefore, United States antitrust law has drawn a dividing line between those 
commercial activities deemed illegal per se—meaning, categorically forbidden in every 
instance—and those whose legality may be determined only upon a fact-specific inquiry into 
competitive effects, using what has become known as the “rule of reason.” In the Court’s words: 
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the 
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so 
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to 
establish their illegality—they are “illegal per se.” In the second category 
are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by 
analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and 
the reasons why it was imposed.17 
Much of the evolution in antitrust thinking during the past generation has resulted from 
courts changing, in response to developments in the scholarly literature, which mode of analysis 
they apply to particular challenged arrangements, the per se rule or rule-of-reason analysis. As 
discussed below, the trend has been in the direction of greater reliance on the rule of reason, with 
a pronounced reduction in the types of cases deemed appropriate for per se rules. Because rule-
of-reason analysis differs from the per se approach in its reliance upon proof of particular market 
effects, it naturally invited further development of an academic and professional literature on 
those topics. Faced with an expanding body of economic literature purporting to illuminate the 
likely competitive effects of various business arrangements, the courts responded by changing 
the law to make that literature relevant. 
In the first eight decades following the enactment of the Sherman Act, the courts 
identified a wide variety of business practices that constituted per se violations of the antitrust 
laws.18 Then-Circuit Judge Taft declared horizontal price-fixing agreements among competitors 
                                                                    
16 A brief but accessible overview of this evolution in antitrust doctrine is available in Nolan Ezra Clark, The 
Future of Antitrust Enforcement, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 401 (1986). 
17 National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). On the development and 
evolution of “rule-of-reason” analysis in antitrust cases, see generally id. at 686–91. See also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
18 The discussion that follows purposefully elides a substantial portion of the complexity of antitrust 
development, such as statutory enactments subsequent to the Clayton and FTC Acts, and the many cases that 
qualified or limited some of the doctrines the Supreme Court announced in the cases cited in this paragraph. My 
purpose herein is not to provide a grounding, however rudimentary, in the substantive law of antitrust (a topic in 
which I claim no special expertise), but rather to state the basis for the discussion that follows concerning the 
6
University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/1
 
to be illegal in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.19 The formation of a holding company 
designed to control the stock of two or more former competitors—the classic “trust” 
arrangement—was categorically outlawed in Northern Securities Co. v. United States.20 Resale 
price maintenance agreements—contracts imposed by a manufacturer on its distributors 
requiring them to resell the manufacturer’s products at or above a specified price, or else lose 
their distributorship—were declared illegal in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co.21 So-called “tying” arrangements, which conditioned a consumer’s purchase of a desired 
product upon the consumer’s agreement to also purchase a second (possibly undesired) product, 
were outlawed in United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States.22 Group boycotts or concerted 
refusals to deal, in which two or more competitors refuse to do business with an upstream 
producer or downstream customer unless the producer or customer ceases to do business with a 
competitor of the group, were outlawed in Fashion Originators’ Guild v. FTC.23 Agreements 
among competitors to divide markets along territorial lines were forbidden in Timken Roller 
Bearing Co. v. United States.24 And vertical non-price restraints, such as agreements imposed by 
a manufacturer forbidding its dealers to carry competing products, were declared unlawful in 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.25 
Even outside the universe of per se unlawful restraints of trade, other elements of 
antitrust jurisprudence as it existed before the late 20th century appear as historical anachronisms 
to contemporary eyes. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,26 for example, the Supreme Court 
condemned on antitrust grounds a merger of two corporations who controlled relatively 
                                                                    
transformation of antitrust law in response to economic criticism. To borrow a metaphor, the actual substantive rules 
of antitrust law are the chessmen on a board, and my interest lies neither in where they began nor where they ended 
up so much as in how they came to be moved during the game. 
19 85 F. 271, 291–301 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also, e.g., United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396–401 (1927). 
20 193 U.S. 197 (1904). The Court specifically emphasized that, in its view, the Sherman Act outlawed “every 
combination or conspiracy which would extinguish competition between otherwise competing railroads” and was 
“not limited to restraints of … trade or commerce that are unreasonable in their nature[.]” Id. at 331 (emphasis in 
original). 
21 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See also, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45–47 (1960). 
22 258 U.S. 451, 457–58 (1922). See also, e.g., United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). 
23 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
24 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
25 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
26 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
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minuscule shares of the market in which they competed.27 Even corporate mergers that promised 
to yield greater efficiencies that would ultimately lead to lower consumer prices were invalidated 
essentially on the grounds that Congress preferred two competitors to one.28 
Antitrust law in this era was hardly divorced from economics. To the contrary, then-
prevailing economic theory maintained that industries characterized by a highly concentrated 
structure with few competitors tended to underperform more competitive industries.29 Backed by 
supportive economic theory and by exhortations from the Supreme Court, federal antitrust 
enforcers embarked on lengthy litigation campaigns aimed at fundamentally restructuring key 
domestic industries, including landmark cases against AT&T30 and IBM.31 
Nevertheless, this entire edifice came under sustained attack from the new “Chicago 
School” strand of neoclassical economic theory beginning around the 1960s, with the volume of 
criticism rising steadily over the two to three decades that followed.32 Nowhere was the criticism 
sharper than with respect to the Court’s treatment of vertical restraints—agreements between 
parties at different levels in the distribution chain, such as manufacturers and distributors.33 As 
early as 1960, for example, the Dr. Miles decision’s categorical prohibition of resale price 
maintenance had been attacked by economists, who argued that the practice could have pro-
                                                                    
27 The acquiring company, Brown, held approximately 4% of the United States retail market for shoes; the 
acquired company, Kinney, held approximately 1.6%. Id. at 303. 
28 See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies 
cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also 
result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.”) (citing Brown Shoe); United States 
v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966) (describing “basic purpose” of the antitrust laws as “to prevent 
concentration in the American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in business”) (footnote 
omitted). 
29 See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4 (2d ed. 1980). 
For economic analyses of some of the types of conduct then condemned as per se violations of the antitrust laws, 
see, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957). 
30 The AT&T litigation lasted over three decades and led ultimately to the company’s divestiture of its 
regional subsidiaries, the so-called “Baby Bells,” that provided local telephone service. See United States v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). 
31 The IBM litigation lasted for thirteen years before being effectively dropped during the first Reagan 
Administration. See In re International Business Machines Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982). 
32 See, e.g., Thomas E. Kauper, The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and 
Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 329, 331 (1968) (complaining that Warren-era antitrust decisions appeared to rest 
upon “a peculiar blend of modern economic theory and Populism” and that “[t]he growing body of economic 
knowledge concerning the effects of vertical integration, resale price maintenance, territorial and other restrictions 
on distributors, and tying arrangements have been virtually ignored.”); Jerrold G. van Cise, The Future of Per Se in 
Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964) (arguing that courts should limit application of rules of per se illegality). 
33 See supra notes 21, 22, 23, 25 and accompanying text. 
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consumer consequences.34 The per se prohibition against tying arrangements was criticized by 
economists who noted that essentially the same economic results could be achieved through 
vertical integration, a practice not subject to the per se rule.35 Group boycotts or concerted 
refusals to deal, some argued, might be pursued for a variety of reasons only some of which 
resulted in the lessening of competition in the market and were therefore likewise inappropriate 
for per se condemnation.36 Similarly, restrictions on distribution and other non-price vertical 
restraints were judged by some observers to be too varied in their effects from one case to 
another to justify their absolute prohibition under a per se rule.37 Indeed, because pro-consumer 
effects of vertical restraints were likely to predominate in most circumstances, Bork went so far 
as to argue that “every vertical restraint should be completely lawful.”38 
The law’s treatment of horizontal restraints, too, came in for substantial criticism. The 
per se rule against price-fixing and other agreements among competitors, some argued, swept too 
broadly, forbidding at least some pro-consumer arrangements39 and slowing the pace of 
cooperative innovation.40 The Court’s sweeping condemnation of horizontal mergers even in the 
                                                                    
34 See Lester G. Tesler, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (Oct. 1960); see 
also, e.g., Thomas W. Gilligan, The Competitive Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 17 RAND J. ECON. 544 (1986); 
Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Resale Price Maintenance Re-examined: Monsanto v. Spray-Rite (1984), in THE 
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 364 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, eds., 3d ed. 1999). 
35 See Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying, and Antitrust Policy, 68 AM. ECON. 
REV. 397, 400–01 (1978) (arguing for rule-of-reason treatment of both tying arrangements and vertical integration). 
See also, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & 
ECON. 345 (1985). 
36 See Joseph P. Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1979); C. Coleman Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to 
Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247. 
37 See Almarin Phillips, Schwinn Rules and the “New Economics” of Vertical Relations, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 
573 (1975); Earl E. Pollock, The Schwinn Per Se Rule: The Case for Reconsideration, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 557 
(1975). 
38 BORK, supra note 1, at 288. 
39 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981); Robert H. Bork, The 
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 429–65 (1966). 
40 See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements 
Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 579 (1993). In an era when the 
United States was particularly sensitive to the perceived risk of losing ground in the innovative arena to foreign 
(and, especially, Japanese) competition, suggestions that the antitrust laws were hampering economically necessary 
forms of cooperation among American firms drew swift legislative responses. See, e.g., National Cooperative 
Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984); National Cooperative Production Amendments of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993). 
9
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face of evidence that post-merger scale economies and efficiency gains would result in lower 
prices41 was criticized as inherently inimical to consumer welfare.42 
In response to these criticisms, the law began to change. Just ten years after declaring 
distribution restrictions and other vertical non-price restraints to be illegal per se in the Schwinn 
case,43 the Supreme Court reversed course, holding in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 
that such restrictions could be lawful under rule-of-reason analysis.44 The GTE Sylvania Court 
noted that “[t]he great weight of scholarly opinion ha[d] been critical of” its prior decision in 
Schwinn, which had caused “continuing controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals 
and in the federal courts.”45 The Court then considered the teachings of economic literature on 
vertical non-price restraints such as those at issue. Noting that previous cases applying per se 
rules of antitrust liability had presumed that the challenged conduct was inherently pernicious, 
the Court found such a presumption inappropriate where vertical restraints were involved 
“because of their potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and 
stimulation of interbrand competition.”46 Because “[e]conomists ha[d] identified a number of 
ways in which manufacturers can use such [vertical] restrictions to compete more effectively 
against other manufacturers,”47 the Court concluded, “the per se rule stated in Schwinn must be 
overruled.”48 
As summarized above, many other rules of per se antitrust liability had grown up over the 
decades before GTE Sylvania.49 Within thirty years after GTE Sylvania, however, most of those 
precedents would be overruled or substantially narrowed. In 1988, the Court effectively extended 
GTE Sylvania by mandating rule-of-reason analysis for all vertical restraints that did not 
incorporate agreements on prices or price levels.50 In 1997, the Court held that vertical maximum 
                                                                    
41 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
42 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, 
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 305–06 (1975) (criticizing 
Supreme Court’s Brown Shoe decision for outlawing a merger based on fears that the merged firm would charge 
lower, rather than higher, prices). 
43 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
44 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
45 Id. at 47–48. 
46 Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 51 n.18 (discussing academic literature on market effects of 
vertical restraints); id. at 69–70 & n.10 (White, J., concurring) (same). 
47 Id. at 54–55. 
48 Id. at 58. 
49 See supra notes 18–28 and accompanying text. 
50 See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735–36 (1988). 
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price-fixing arrangements must be evaluated under the rule of reason.51 A decade later, with 
extensive citations to economic literature, the Court mandated rule-of-reason analysis for 
minimum resale price maintenance agreements as well.52 
Without formally overruling its precedents declaring tying arrangements to constitute a 
per se antitrust violation,53 the Supreme Court effectively retreated from a per se rule beginning 
in 1977 by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate market power and competitive harm from the 
defendant’s conduct, ordinarily components of a rule-of-reason analysis.54 Even horizontal 
agreements among competitors, the Court recognized in 1984, could be evaluated under the rule 
of reason where “horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
available at all.”55 The Court applied rule-of-reason analysis to concerted refusals to deal during 
the 1980s,56 although it retreated from those rulings (over a vigorous dissent) a few years later.57 
The Court also ruled that horizontal mergers could not be attacked on the grounds that they 
would yield lower, rather than higher, consumer prices.58 The Supreme Court, moreover, held 
that a plaintiff’s complaint alleging an antitrust violation could not even proceed beyond the 
                                                                    
51 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 149 (1968)). 
The courts’ historic per se condemnation of price-fixing, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, survives today 
only as regards horizontal price-fixing between competitors, see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc’y, 457 
U.S. 332, 342–55 (1982), although even this rule may now be open to doubt: Maricopa relied for its per se rule 
partly on the Court’s reasoning in Albrecht (see 457 U.S. at 347), and Albrecht has since been overruled by Khan. 
52 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–99 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)). 
53 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
54 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (requiring inquiry into 
“probability of anticompetitive consequences” from challenged tying arrangement); United States Steel Corp. v. 
Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (requiring proof of market power). See generally Illinois Tool Works 
Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33–39 (2006) (reviewing history of Court’s tying jurisprudence and 
noting several steps the Court had taken to weaken per se condemnation of tying arrangements); id. at 43 
(condemnation of tying arrangement “must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by a 
mere presumption thereof”) (footnote omitted). 
55 National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). 
56 See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986); Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293–98 (1985). 
57 Compare Federal Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (applying per 
se rule to group boycott), with id. at 438–46 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing against 
per se condemnation of group boycotts that involve an expressive component). 
58 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 114–17 (1986). The Court signaled its retreat from 
the principles it had described as animating the antitrust laws two decades earlier, noting that there was now 
“considerable disagreement” whether the antitrust laws should be so construed as to “keep small competitors in 
business at the expense of efficiency.” Id. at 116 n.11; cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
11
Armstrong: Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2016
 
pleading stage if economic theory suggested reasonable grounds for the defendants to engage in 
the actions alleged.59 
By the first decade of the 21st century, the transformation was complete: what had 
originated as the Chicago School’s critique of antitrust law had itself become the law. Judge 
Posner introduced a new edition of his book Antitrust Law by trumpeting the fact that Chicago-
School economic analysis and the substantive law of antitrust had melded together so thoroughly 
that it no longer made sense to speak of the two as distinct: 
The first edition of this book, published a quarter of a century ago, bore 
the subtitle “An Economic Perspective,” implying there were other 
perspectives. . . . In the intervening years, the other perspectives have 
largely fallen away, a change that I have marked by dropping the subtitle 
from this new edition.60 
III. The Public Domain in Copyright Law 
The public domain lies outside the borders of intellectual property:61 it contains material 
not protected by a copyright, patent, or other intellectual property right62 and therefore “free as 
the air to common use.”63 The public domain constitutes a special form of what economists 
                                                                    
59 See Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
60 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW vii (2d ed. 2001) (footnote omitted); see also id. at ix (“Almost 
everyone professionally involved in antitrust today—whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed 
observer—not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also 
agrees on the essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to determine the consistency of specific 
business practices with that goal.”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE v (1994) (“Today the union of antitrust and economics is so complete that one 
cannot study antitrust seriously without at least some exposure to economics.”). 
61 See James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2003). 
62 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964). This is perhaps the most common understanding of the term “public 
domain”; however, as discussed below, other ways of identifying the public domain exist. To take only one example, 
uncopyrightable elements within an otherwise protected work—such as individual facts within an original factual 
compilation, or functional components within a computer program—may be freely reused by others and are 
therefore in some sense a part of the public domain as well, notwithstanding that the work in which they appeared is 
subject to copyright protection. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 
359 (1991) (recognizing that uncopyrightable facts remain free to copy even after being incorporated into a 
potentially copyrightable compilation); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 234 (1990) (recognizing that addition of 
copyrightable material to public domain story elements does not confer copyright ownership over those story 
elements); Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992) (“material found in the 
public domain . . . is free for the taking and cannot be appropriated by a single author even though it is included in a 
copyrighted work”). 
63 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see 
also, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (“once the patent or 
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recognize as a “commons,” a zone from which no economic actor has a right to exclude others.64 
Material formerly protected by an intellectual property right may enter the public domain 
through expiration of the statutory term of protection (in the case of copyrights and patents),65 
through the owner’s noncompliance with a legal condition required for protection,66 or through 
the owner’s voluntary relinquishment of rights.67 The public domain also includes material 
statutorily defined as ineligible for intellectual property protection such as federal government 
works.68 
Because the public domain consists of material outside the coverage of copyright, 
changes in copyright law’s outer boundaries over time necessarily affect the content of the public 
domain.69 For example, legislative extensions of the copyright term slow the entry of 
copyrighted works into the public domain.70 Similarly, because the existence of copyright rights 
                                                                    
copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution”); TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“In general, unless an intellectual property right 
such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.”); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 
674 (1969) (noting “the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain”). 
64 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 14–15 (2003). The analogy to commonses in traditional property nomenclature is necessarily inexact 
because the nonrivalrous character of intellectual property goods prevents “intellectual commonses” from becoming 
depleted through overuse. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 
47–49 (2008). 
65 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–304 (2012) (specifying duration of copyright protection); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) 
(specifying duration of patent protection). 
66 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (certain disclosures made by the inventor more than one year 
before filing of application for patent may bar issuance of patent). 
67 Doctrines of abandonment have been developed by the courts in respect of most of the varieties of 
intellectual property. See, e.g., Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 597–98 (1911) (trademark); Pennock v. 
Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 16 (1829) (patent); National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 598 
(2d Cir. 1951) (copyright). 
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012); see also infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
69 This is so, at least, with respect to the most common understanding of the term “public domain” as a 
reference to works currently unprotected by copyright; in this limited respect (even if not in others) it does indeed 
make sense to understand the public domain “as a kind of zero sum game.” Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse 
on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 825 (2006) (discussing evolution in Professor David Lange’s views over the 
course of his scholarship on the public domain). Enlarging our understanding of what constitutes the public domain 
necessarily complicates this binary picture; for example, virtually every copyrighted work adds to the effective 
public domain at least a bit by the contribution thereto of its own unprotectable elements. See supra note 62 and 
authorities cited (noting the lack of copyright protection for certain elements within copyrighted works); Samuelson, 
supra, at 825 & nn.207–08 (recognizing expansion of public domain by unprotectable elements of copyrighted 
works). 
70 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); L. Ray Patterson, What’s Wrong 
with Eldred?: An Essay on Copyright Jurisprudence, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 345, 348 (2003). 
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depends on legislative recognition,71 the creation by Congress of new exclusive copyright 
rights72 necessarily withdraws from the public the ability to engage in such uses without a 
license, and Congress’s extension of copyright protection to new subject matter73 likewise ends 
the public’s freedom to use such works without authorization. 
This inverse relationship between the scope of copyright protection and the scope of the 
public domain has become ever more important precisely because copyright has grown: 
copyright now covers broader subject matter, provides more types of exclusive rights, and lasts 
longer than ever.74 As copyright has expanded, the domain of material available for free public 
use has correspondingly shrunk. Successive restrictions on the public domain, in turn, have 
sparked growing interest among copyright scholars in the purposes and functions of the public 
domain. 
A. The Public Domain in Copyright Discourse 
An outpouring of copyright scholarship over the last generation has examined in 
considerable depth the purposes served by the public domain. The overall effect has been to 
relocate the public domain from the periphery of copyright policy, of interest only as an abstract 
or theoretical matter, to a position much nearer its core. Without attempting to catalog this 
voluminous literature in anything approaching an exhaustive scope, some of the more 
compelling strands of scholarly research concerning the importance of the public domain may be 
briefly summarized. 
Professor Pamela Samuelson has noted that intellectual property scholars apply the label 
“public domain” in a bewildering variety of ways.75 This multiplicity of understandings, she 
                                                                    
71 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) (recognizing that copyright legislation “instead of 
sanctioning an existing right . . . created it.”). 
72 See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing 
formal legislative protection for authors’ rights to create derivative works in Copyright Act of 1909); Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2(3), 109 Stat. 336, 336 (1995) 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012)) (creating right for public performance via digital audio transmission); Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863–76 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 1201–1205 (2012)) (creating rights against circumvention of technological protection measures and alteration of 
copyright management information). 
73 See, e.g., Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VII, 104 Stat. 5089, 
5133–34 (1990) (architectural works); Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028–29 (1980) (software). 
74 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 977–993 (1990) (tracing expansion of subject 
matter coverage and exclusive rights provided under copyright statutes from 1790 to 1976 alongside judicial 
doctrines that generally served to exclude portions of works from protection). On the history of legislative 
expansions of the duration of copyright protection, see generally Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194–96. 
75 See Samuelson, supra note 69, at 789–813 (enumerating thirteen conceptually distinct uses of the term in 
intellectual property literature); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 151 fig. 1 (2003) (representing multiple common understandings of the content of 
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argues, is valuable insofar as it permits recognition of a wider variety of social values served by 
each of the different “public domains” that scholars have identified.76 The multiple uses of the 
term “public domain,” however, can also cloud understanding by introducing uncertainty at just 
the point where clarity is most needed: to wit, in determining whether a particular use of a 
particular work poses legal risk.77 Without discounting the benefits of the broader conceptions 
Professor Samuelson describes, it makes some sense to focus attention herein on the more 
limited universe of works the use of which involves no risk of legal liability to the user and to 
explore the benefits that have been articulated for the availability of such works. 
1. As a source of the raw materials of creation 
Professor Jessica Litman’s celebrated article The Public Domain78 articulates one of the 
most frequently invoked justifications for defending the public domain against encroachment by 
proprietary claims: namely, that the public domain supplies the reservoir of creative and 
expressive materials upon which authors draw to create new works. Authorship, on this view, 
does not occur ex nihilo, but rather represents an iterative, incremental exercise building upon a 
shared commons of cultural antecedents.79 An author’s ability to reuse those public-domain 
antecedents without legal risk, the argument goes, itself spurs the creation of new works.80 
In a similar vein, Professor James Boyle rejects, as a “powerful (and historically 
contingent) stereotype,” the “romantic vision of authorship, of the genius whose style forever 
expresses a single unique persona.”81 The stereotype is flawed, he explains, insofar as “the 
romantic vision of authorship plays down the importance of external sources by emphasizing the 
                                                                    
the public domain in visual form). See also, e.g., Ashley Packard, Copyright Term Extensions, the Public Domain 
and Intertextuality Intertwined, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 15–16 (2002). 
76  See Samuelson, supra note 69, at 826–27. 
77 This risk is heightened with respect to those uses of the term “public domain” that refer principally to the 
public availability of a work rather than to its legal status, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 69, at 797–99, for users of 
copyrighted works that are widely available online may be quite surprised to find themselves in legal trouble. See id. 
at 831. It is partly for this reason that participants in the open-source software movement (and similar open-content 
licensing movements such as Creative Commons) generally take pains to emphasize that their works are actually 
copyrighted and not free for public use except upon the terms stated in the applicable licenses. See, e.g., Timothy K. 
Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 
47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 367 n.40, 370–71 (2010). 
78 See Litman, supra note 74. 
79 See id. at 966 (“the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and recombination 
than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea”), 1007–12. 
80 See Armstrong, supra note 77, at 367 & n.36. 
81 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 56 (1996). 
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unique genius of the author and the originality of the work.”82 A legal regime premised upon the 
“romantic author” notion will tend to portray authors as deserving, and even noble, beneficiaries 
of copyright’s largesse.83 Benefits given to authors, however, come at a significant, and 
underappreciated, social cost: cleaving too closely to the “romantic vision,” Boyle writes, 
threatens to “impede innovation and scientific progress, diminish the availability of our cultural 
heritage, inhibit artistic innovation, and restrict public debate and free speech.”84 One need not 
diminish the importance of individual authorial endeavor to recognize that “[t]he tendency of the 
current system to undervalue the importance of the public domain can deprive the truly creative 
among us of the raw material necessary to create their next transformative artifacts.”85 
The view that authorship depends on a vibrant, vital public domain also was ably 
summarized by Judge Kozinski in White v. Samsung Electronics America Inc.: 
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. 
Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, 
likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science 
and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the 
works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative 
forces it’s supposed to nurture.86 
Judge Posner agreed, writing recently in Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., that: 
[E]xtending copyright protection is a two-edged sword from the 
standpoint of inducing creativity, as it would reduce the incentive of 
subsequent authors to create derivative works (such as new versions of 
popular fictional characters like Holmes and Watson) by shrinking the 
public domain. For the longer the copyright term is, the less public-
domain material there will be and so the greater will be the cost of 
authorship, because authors will have to obtain licenses from copyright 
holders for more material[.]87 
This view of the importance of the public domain carries particular force because of its 
clear linkage to copyright law’s fundamental objective: to promote the creation and 
                                                                    
82 Id. at 114. 
83 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003). 
84 BOYLE, supra note 81, at 125. 
85 Id. at 165. 
86 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
87 755 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2014); see also id. (“The smaller the public domain, the more work is involved 
in the creation of a new work. The defendant’s proposed rule would also encourage authors to continue to write 
stories involving old characters in an effort to prolong copyright protection, rather than encouraging them to create 
stories with entirely new characters. The effect would be to discourage creativity.”). 
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dissemination of expressive works. If Professors Litman and Boyle, and Judges Kozinski and 
Posner, are correct that fostering new creative expression depends on the abundance and 
accessibility of works in the public domain, then protecting the public domain against proprietary 
encroachment is an essential step in advancing copyright law’s ultimate ends. 
2. As a guarantor of free expression 
Closely aligned with the preceding view is a related argument. If the public domain 
fosters the creation of new expressive works, then protecting the public domain serves not only 
the traditional interest of copyright law, but also promotes constitutional free speech. Professor 
Yochai Benkler writes that treating expressive material as a form of property carries an inherent 
risk of chilling expression, because we are habituated by long experience to thinking of property 
as something whose distribution can be controlled (or even prevented entirely) by its owner, a 
concept difficult to square with First Amendment principles.88 Recognizing a form of property 
right in expressive material, as copyright does, is not the same as recognizing property rights in 
real estate or corporate stock. As Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel notes: “Unlike most property 
rights, copyright law is fundamentally an instrument of media and communications policy and an 
integral part of our system of free expression.”89 
The Supreme Court has expressed inconsistent views on the relationship between 
copyright and First Amendment interests. The fault partly lies in a temporal confusion about just 
whose speech is affected by the operation of the law. If one begins by assuming that more speech 
is generally preferable to less speech,90 then that policy that promotes speech the most while 
interfering with speech the least is best. Yet, copyright law both rewards and punishes speech.91 
Consider two speakers, “A” and “B.” A’s speech occurs first in time and is thereafter quoted and 
criticized by B. If the promise of remuneration led A to speak when she would otherwise have 
remained silent, then copyright has served First Amendment interests; it is surely something like 
this that the Court had in mind when it wrote that “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the 
                                                                    
88 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the 
Public Domain, 74 NYU L. REV. 354, 356 (1999) (“Expecting information to be owned, and to be controlled by its 
owner, blinds us to the cost that this property system imposes on our freedom to speak.”). 
89 NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 38 (2008). For a sustained argument for substantially 
curtailing intellectual property rights in expressive material because of the conflict thereby created with expressive 
interests, see DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN 
ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009). 
90 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled 
with freedom.”) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) 
(“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”). 
91 See NETANEL, supra note 89, at 37 (“Copyright both fosters original expression and impedes uses of 
existing expression.”). 
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engine of free expression.”92 A’s copyright, however, can prevent B’s speech from occurring, 
curtailing rather than fostering expression.93 Concern with the restrictive effect of an earlier 
speaker’s copyright on a later speaker’s expression led the Court to declare that copyright’s 
limitations, including the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine, constituted the 
law’s “built-in First Amendment accommodations.”94 The Court’s most recent foray into the 
relationship between copyright and free speech principles, Golan v. Holder, will be taken up 
below; the point for present purposes is simply to emphasize that the contours of the public 
domain are consequential for reasons of constitutional magnitude, not merely because the public 
domain provides the raw materials for the creation of new copyrightable expressive works. 
3. As a repository of scientific truth 
A third benefit flowing from the existence of a robust public domain has to do with its 
status as a repository of human knowledge and scientific truth, irrespective of whether those 
materials are used to create additional expressive works. The constitutional referent here lies not 
in the First Amendment, but the Progress (or Intellectual Property) Clause, which empowers 
Congress to grant “exclusive rights” to “authors” in order “to promote the progress of science.”95 
Scientific inquiry depends upon processes, such as broad dissemination of research materials for 
purposes such as peer review and testing the reproducibility of results, that stand in tension with 
strong claims of proprietary ownership.96 Fulfilling the constitutional purpose of “promoting 
progress,” therefore, requires us to preserve a zone of basic information that remains available 
for free and legally unencumbered discussion, sharing, and analysis. 
So central to copyright’s purpose is the conception of the public domain as a repository 
of scientific and factual knowledge that the principle receives overlapping protection from many 
directions and multiple doctrines at once. Indeed, the Copyright Act itself, which has relatively 
                                                                    
92 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
93 See John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 245 (2015) (cataloging multiple uses of 
copyright to suppress expression); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (expressing concern that courts in copyright cases, applying 
the mechanism of injunctive relief, may effectively impose prior restraints on speech without conducting any First 
Amendment analysis). 
94 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). See generally infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text. 
95 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution’s phraseology should be understood in contemporary usage 
as meaning something akin to the “advancement of knowledge” or the “promotion of learning.” Cf., e.g., Pierre N. 
Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2002). 
96 See, e.g., Christopher M. Kelty, Free Software/Free Science, FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 2001) (citing Robert K. 
Merton’s sociological norms of scientific endeavor that treat “ideas, formulae, data, or results” as essentially a form 
of common property), available at http://perma.cc/AAJ7-KLU5; Mario Biagioli, Rights or Rewards?: Changing 
Contexts and Definitions of Scientific Authorship, 27 J. COLLEGE & UNIVERSITY L. 83, 84 (2000). 
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little to say about the importance of fostering creative reuses of other authors’ expression,97 
delimits the fact-oriented public domain in express terms, declaring “any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery” to be unprotected by the 
copyright of the work in which it appears.98 
Although the roots of the fact-oriented public domain extend as far back as the Supreme 
Court’s 1879 decision in Baker v. Selden, which held that the copyright in plaintiff’s accounting 
book was not infringed by defendant’s description of a similar system of accounting in his own 
book,99 the Court considered the policy behind excluding factual matter from copyright in 
considerably greater depth in its more recent decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.100 There, the Court explained: 
[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is 
one between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a 
particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its 
existence. . . . Census takers, for example, do not “create” the population 
figures that emerge from their efforts; in a sense, they copy these figures 
from the world around them. Census data therefore do not trigger 
copyright because these data are not “original” in the constitutional sense. 
The same is true of all facts—scientific, historical, biographical, and news 
of the day. “[T]hey may not be copyrighted and are part of the public 
domain available to every person.”101 
Consistently with this view, the Court has also invoked the need for free-ranging scientific 
inquiry as a basis for limiting the scope of patent protection.102 
                                                                    
97 The statutory recognition of the fair use doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), probably represents the closest 
thing to a legislative recognition of the justifications offered for the public domain in the first two subparts of the 
present discussion—and even there, the provision takes the form of an affirmative defense to liability rather than a 
legislative declaration that some material is outside the scope of copyright protection in the first instance. 
98 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
99 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
100 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
101 Id. at 347–48 (citations omitted). 
102 See, e.g., Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989) (“concepts within the 
public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all” and “provide 
the baseline of free competition upon which the patent system’s incentive to creative effort depends”). The Court’s 
recent decisions denying patent eligibility to what it perceived as basic research tools or the raw materials of 
scientific inquiry represent further expressions of this principle. See Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012); cf. Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (recognizing that patents “can discourage research by impeding the free 
exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by 
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Copyright law’s merger doctrine creates a further buffer zone around factual and 
scientific knowledge to prevent the free reuse of such knowledge from being encumbered by 
proprietary claims. The merger rule, as commonly understood, denies copyright protection not 
only to raw factual information itself, but also to expression necessary to communicate that 
information.103 In sum, an appreciation of the public domain’s value as a repository of scientific 
and factual knowledge, and recognition that the advancement of learning depends to some degree 
on such knowledge remaining lawfully free to reuse and distribute, has produced a wide variety 
of particular legal rules that serve, individually and in the aggregate, to preserve the public 
domain against encroaching proprietization. 
4. As a disciplining mechanism for licensing markets 
A further benefit to the wide availability of expressive content in the public domain lies 
in its effects upon licensing transactions for non-public-domain works. Copyright owners asked 
to license their work for expressive reuse may be deterred from asking too high a price if a 
tolerably close substitute for their work is available in the public domain. The availability of 
similar (and freely reusable) expressive content in the public domain gives later creators an 
alternative to negotiating with earlier creators for a license, and the existence of this alternative 
may deter earlier creators from demanding excessive compensation for reuse of their works. 
An example may illuminate the basic point. An author who wishes to borrow from West 
Side Story to craft her own tale of star-crossed lovers must expect to pay for the rights to do so, 
because West Side Story is under copyright. If the owners of West Side Story’s copyright demand 
a fee higher than she is willing to pay, they will reach no agreement.104 But West Side Story’s 
                                                                    
leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex 
licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.”). 
103 See, e.g., Kregos v. AP, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (“even expression is not protected in those 
instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression would 
effectively accord protection to the idea itself”); Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 
600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Some ideas admit of only a limited number of expressions. When there is essentially only 
one way to express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying that 
expression.”). 
104 This risk is substantial. See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Applied welfare economics, in A HANDBOOK OF 
CULTURAL ECONOMICS 20, 28 (Ruth Towse, ed., 2003) (“Prohibitively high licensing fees are equivalent to outright 
refusal to license to anyone”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 95–99 (2004) (recounting one such incident). Transaction 
costs, too, may prevent bargaining even where the parties may be able to agree on a reasonable license value. See 
Richard A. Posner, Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 326 (2005). The well-known “orphan works” problem illustrates the 
problem of transaction costs and presents another scenario in which the cost of identifying the proper licensor may 
exceed the value to be derived from entering into a license. See, e.g., Cecil C. Kuhne, III, The Steadily Shrinking 
Public Domain: Inefficiencies of Existing Copyright Law in the Modern Technology Age, 50 LOY. L. REV. 549, 558–
59 (2004); M. William Krasilovsky, Observations on the Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 205, 
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owners may be deterred from demanding an exorbitantly high fee by the knowledge that, if the 
parties cannot agree on licensing terms, the would-be author may draw similar content from 
Romeo and Juliet, which is in the public domain (and from which West Side Story itself drew).105 
The point is perhaps a small one and should not be overstated, but in essence, the public domain 
provides an alternative pool of expressive content the availability of which discourages copyright 
holders from demanding excessive licensing fees and thereby facilitates at least some 
transactions that would not otherwise occur.106 This suggests that the public domain should be 
valued not only for its own sake, but for the constraining force it exerts on copyright owners in 
licensing negotiations and for its resulting encouragement of mutually advantageous bargaining 
over reuse of expressive works. 
B. Policy Implications of Copyright Scholarship on the Public Domain 
The preceding discussion provides an assortment of rationales collectively suggesting 
that the public domain needs a relatively robust level of legal protection against encroachment by 
proprietary claims. A well-developed corpus of legal scholarship on the public domain, however, 
suggests that current United States copyright law undervalues and underprotects the public 
domain, thereby disserving interests of both statutory and constitutional magnitude. Public 
domain scholarship calls attention to the “costs” side of copyright’s ledger of costs and benefits. 
In so doing, this scholarship highlights the difficulties that follow from treating copyright as a 
matter of right (rather than of legislative grace) for authors and from maintaining an over-
romanticized image of authorial endeavor. If the romantic, moralistic view of authorship suggests 
that copyright rights cannot be made too strong or too lengthy in duration, public domain 
scholarship supplies an important corrective: just because some level of copyright protection is 
good, it does not follow that a higher level of protection is necessarily better, for every alteration 
in the balance comes at a cost to someone. Giving more rewards to yesterday’s authors penalizes 
tomorrow’s, whose costs to create will rise and whose incentives to create may correspondingly 
diminish, resulting in a contraction (rather than an expansion) of expressive output. Professor 
Yochai Benkler summarized this basic insight: 
Today’s users of information are not only today’s readers and consumers. 
They are also today’s producers and tomorrow’s innovators. Their net 
                                                                    
212 (1967) (“Imagine the block on cultural development if the heirs of Shakespeare or Beethoven would have to be 
located to grant licenses.”). 
105 Cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 64, at 67–68 (cataloging illustrations of expressive borrowing). 
106 By focusing in this portion of the essay on the public domain’s impact on copyright licensing, I make no 
normative claims about the primacy of licensing transactions as a preferred means of fostering expressive activity. 
Cf., e.g., Molly Shaeffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1565–66 (2005) 
(questioning overly rosy descriptions of licensing markets in copyright case law and scholarship). In particular, the 
Supreme Court’s view that private licensing transactions represent a constitutionally adequate replacement for the 
free availability of public domain information seems entirely misguided. See infra note 286 and accompanying text. 
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benefit from a strengthened patent or copyright regime, given not only 
increased potential revenues but also the increased costs, may be negative. 
If we pass a law that regulates information production too strictly, 
allowing its beneficiaries to impose prices that are too high on today’s 
innovators, then we will have not only too little consumption of 
information today, but also too little production of new information for 
tomorrow.107 
Maintaining (or, in most scholars’ view, establishing) the optimal balance between the 
interests of copyright holders in their works and the broader public’s interest in the public 
domain would entail substantial alterations to current law. Scholars have proposed a wide 
assortment of alterations to current law to account better for the importance of the public domain. 
One family of proposals seeks to protect the public domain against proprietary encroachment: if 
the public domain is itself a form of property held in common, then perhaps its borders should be 
clearly staked and marked,108 and parties who wrongly assert individual ownership of any 
portion of the commons should be penalized.109 It should be easy for authors who wish to place 
their works into the public domain to do so,110 and the public should be entitled permanently to 
rely on the public-domain status of a work.111 Other proposals, seeking to foster creative 
repurposing (not mere copying) of expressive material, would withdraw from copyright holders 
the power to control noncommercial exploitation112 or the exclusive right to create derivative 
works.113 A more significant transformation would result under proposals to restore some formal 
                                                                    
107 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND 
FREEDOM 38 (2006). 
108 See, e.g., David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139 (2009); David Lange, 
Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 176–77 (1981) (suggesting that recognition of 
any claim of proprietary ownership should be accompanied by express terms setting the outer limits of the grant). 
109 See JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ch. 8 (2011) 
(proposing new scheme of civil liability to deter false claims of proprietary ownership of public-domain materials). 
110 See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1175, 1227–28 (2010). 
111 Compare id. with infra notes 284–286 and accompanying text. See also Armstrong, supra note 77, at 409–
10 (arguing that authors’ express dedications to the public domain may nevertheless be revocable under current law); 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital Age, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1121, 1149 (2003) (questioning whether existing law provides any enforceable mechanism for a 
permanent dedication of an author’s work to the public domain). 
112 See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 41–45 (2010). 
113 See Derek Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345 
(2008). 
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requirements for copyright protection, such as registration and renewal114—requirements that 
may contravene the United States’ treaty commitments,115 at least as they now exist.116 Finally, 
and perhaps most dramatically, the open-source software phenomenon (and the movement for 
open content more generally, illustrated by the work of the Creative Commons organization) 
represent efforts to leverage contract and copyright principles to erect what is in essence a second 
“quasi-public” domain consisting of works that may freely be reused and repurposed provided a 
set of (comparatively lenient) license conditions are met.117 
Copyright law today thus stands roughly where antitrust law stood in the late 1970s. 
Antitrust scholars of that era saw a body of law that they believed had grown ossified and 
disserved consumer interests. Today’s copyright scholars see a body of law that increases the 
costs of creating expressive works and fits poorly with the realities of the modern information 
economy. The policy changes that antitrust underwent during the last three decades, however, so 
far have no parallel in copyright law. 
                                                                    
114 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003). See generally Symposium, 
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright for the Internet Age, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1415 (2013). 
115 See Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 5(2), opened for signature Sept. 9, 
1886, 6 U.S.T. 2731 (“[t]he enjoyment and exercise of [copyright] rights shall not be subject to any formality”) 
[hereafter “Berne Convention”]. A creative attempt to reconcile the Berne Convention’s prohibition on formalities 
with a renewed registration requirement is articulated in Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright Duration and the Progressive 
Degeneration of a Constitutional Doctrine, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 189 (2005), which would make copyright 
protection beyond the life-plus-50 term mandated by Art. 7(1) of the Berne Convention contingent upon registration 
of copyright in the work. 
116 The size of its economy confers on the United States a measure of bargaining power in international 
negotiations over intellectual property matters, at least vis-à-vis smaller economic actors. For example, the United 
States has been successful in insisting that smaller trading partners strengthen intellectual property protections as a 
condition for entering into free trade agreements with the U.S. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: 
Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011); Carsten Fink & Patrick 
Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: Intellectual Property Provisions of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, in TRADE, DOHA, 
AND DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE ISSUES 289 (Richard Newfarmer, ed., 2006); Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus 
Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215 (Lorand 
Bartels & Federico Ortino, eds., 2006). These examples provide at least some reason to believe that, were the United 
States to adopt new formal requirements for securing or maintaining copyright protection, it would be possible to 
alter the United States’ international commitments to make such formal requirements lawful. Indeed, the more likely 
course may be to secure international agreement first, then adopt implementing legislation in the United States as 
occurred in the case of the DMCA. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 122–45 (2001). On the other hand, 
amending international treaties to permit formal conditions on copyright protection would require the assent of 
larger world economies as well, who may have less reason to acquiesce to pressure from the United States; indeed, it 
was international dislike of then-existing U.S. copyright formalities that partly led to the enactment of the URAA 
statute discussed below. See infra notes 222–238 and accompanying text. 
117 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183 (2004). 
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IV. Solicitude for the Public Domain in Copyright Cases and Policy 
A. Limiting the Public Domain 
A colleague once asked Professor Jonathan Zittrain, “why [do] all the cyberprofs hate 
copyright?”118 Although “hate” is probably the wrong word, he replied, it was certainly true that 
“[a]lmost all of us who study and write about the law of cyberspace agree that copyright law is a 
big mess.”119 Indeed, observations about the overwhelmingly critical state of copyright 
scholarship have themselves become a sort of meta-component of academic discourse.120 
Although the law has defenders who have occasionally expressed dismay at the critical 
barrage,121 and some parts of the law undoubtedly enjoy greater popularity than others,122 the 
overall tone of scholarly commentary on copyright law has a distinctly critical flavor. 
Outside the academic community, however, matters generally are different. Some of this 
surely reflects simple economics; the business world promises great fortunes to be made in 
creating and defending intellectual property,123 whereas the broader social stake in the public 
domain may be too attenuated to attract comparable legal resources.124 Nevertheless, scholarship 
                                                                    
118 Jonathan Zittrain, The Copyright Cage, LEGAL AFFAIRS (July/Aug. 2003), http://perma.cc/9DZN-XDP3. 
119 Id. 
120 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, This American Copyright Life: Reflections on Re-equilibrating Copyright for the 
Internet Age, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2347674 (Oct. 30, 2013), manuscript at 4 (“at no time in … 
copyright law’s 300 year history, has the copyright system been more severely criticized as being out of touch and 
out of date”); Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740, 740 (2013) (“Copyright 
law has taken quite a beating in the legal literature in the past decade or so.”); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: 
Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 537 & n.1. 
121 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 117, at 183 n.1; Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 1 (1997) (“For one drawn to copyright both for its intellectual fascination and its 
inspiring goals of fostering creativity and protecting authorship, I am distressed to learn that I am among the 
defenders of a fallen faith”). 
122 I am unaware, for example, of any substantial disagreement over copyright’s core principle that authors 
should be empowered to prevent unauthorized, nontransformative commercial duplication of their works. On the 
other hand, scholarly commentary on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act certainly resembles Judge Bork’s 
“cascade of vituperation.” See supra note 1. 
123 See, e.g., Kevin G. Rivette et al., Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Jan./Feb. 2000, at 54. 
124 As others have recognized, a basic collective action problem exists whenever economic rights in a 
particular piece of property come into conflict with the interests of the broader public, for the public’s interest is 
unlikely to be directly represented in any individual case—or may be represented, at best, only by proxy, to the 
extent that the interests of a party opposing the assertion of exclusive rights may resemble the interests of the public. 
See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 64, at 241 (noting that one problem with preserving the public domain is that rights 
holders’ interests are concentrated and tangible, while the public’s interest is more diffuse). For examples of 
organizations and individuals working to overcome the collective action dilemma, see id. at 243–44; Peter Goodrich, 
Sonia K. Katyal, & Rebecca Tushnet, Panel I: Critical Legal Studies in Intellectual Property and Information Law 
24
University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/1
 
tending to support significant limits on copyright is broadly available for use by advocates in 
real-world cases and surely is known to the courts. Unlike in antitrust law, however, where 
hostile scholarly commentary produced substantial changes in legal doctrine, in intellectual 
property, “this outpouring of scholarship has been notably unsuccessful in winning judicial 
converts.”125 The point may be illustrated by considering a few cases in which the interests of 
copyright holders have come into conflict with the principle that a strong and vibrant public 
domain deserves protection against proprietary encroachment. This section considers three such 
cases: the Supreme Court’s decisions in Eldred v. Ashcroft126 and Golan v. Holder,127 and the 
Ninth Circuit’s intervening decision in Kahle v.Gonzales.128 The cases will be discussed 
chronologically. 
1. Eldred v. Ashcroft 
In the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”),129 Congress extended by 
20 years the duration of all copyrights then in force. For works published and copyrighted before 
January 1, 1978, the statute lengthened the second term of protection that all works were 
potentially eligible to receive from 47 to 67 years (while leaving the first term of 28 years 
unaltered, thus increasing the total duration of copyright for such works from 75 to 95 years).130 
For works created on or after January 1, 1978, the statute extended the duration of copyright 
from 50 to 70 years after the death of the author (or last surviving co-author) of the work.131 
By extending the duration of copyright protection, the CTEA blocked the entry of 
existing works into the public domain. The works most immediately affected were those 
                                                                    
Scholarship, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601, 607–10 (2013) (comments of Rebecca Tushnet); Victoria Smith 
Ekstrand, Andrew Famiglietti, & Suzanne V.L. Berg, Birthing “CLA”: Critical Legal Activism, the IP Wars and 
Forking the Law, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 663, 675–81 (2013). 
125 Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169, 1171 
(2007). The quotation refers specifically to scholarship on copyright and the First Amendment, but the basic point 
applies quite a bit more generally than that context may suggest. For thoughts along similar lines, see, e.g., Jennifer 
E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 464 (2010) (“Even 
though there have been ever-increasing calls by intellectual property (IP) scholars for greater First Amendment 
scrutiny in copyright cases, there has been a virtually unrelenting rejection of First Amendment review in copyright 
cases.”); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 (1993) (“Lawyers, law professors, and even judges are on record 
pleading for the law to subject intellectual property to the same free speech principles that limit other assertions of 
governmental power. … But the courts have too often turned a deaf ear to these arguments.”). 
126 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
127 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
128 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007). 
129 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
130 Id. § 102(d), 112 Stat. at 2827–28 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 304). 
131 Id. § 102(b), 112 Stat. at 2827 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 302). 
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published beginning in the year 1923. Before the CTEA, works copyrighted in 1923 would have 
enjoyed an initial term of copyright protection of 28 years (until the end of 1951), followed by a 
renewal term of 47 years (until the end of 1998) and would thereafter have entered the public 
domain. By lengthening the second copyright term to 67 years, however, the CTEA kept those 
works out of the public domain until the end of 2018 (assuming Congress enacts no further 
legislative extensions). The same is necessarily true of all copyrighted works published more 
recently than 1923: works published in 1924 (and validly renewed) will now enter the public 
domain at the end of 2019 rather than 1999; those published in 1925 in 2020 rather than 2000; 
and so forth. The effect of the CTEA was to put a 20-year moratorium on the entry of 
copyrighted works into the public domain, although the statute did not restore protection to any 
works whose copyrights had previously expired.132 
Copyright and constitutional law scholars roundly criticized the statute.133 Although no 
one doubted that Congress generally possessed the power to fix the duration of copyright 
rights,134 its exercise of that power retroactively to extend the duration of copyright in pre-
existing works struck many observers as problematic. The basic argument concerned incentives 
to create: An author considering today whether to create a work might be moved to do so by 
Congress’s promise that the author’s copyright protection would endure for a longer period, but 
such a calculus could not possibly matter to authors who had already created their works at the 
                                                                    
132 Thus, works published under copyright in 1922 or earlier remained in the public domain in the United 
States notwithstanding the CTEA. (Using the 28-year first term followed by 47-year second term framework, 
copyright in a 1922 work would have expired December 31, 1997.) 
133 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 70–74 (2001); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical 
Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19 (2001); Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, The Proper Scope 
of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000); Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization and the 
Goals of Copyright: Property Rights or Cultural Progress, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 132–35 (1998) 
(discerning trend in recent copyright legislation to provide greater private rights without corresponding public 
benefit); William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 907, 923–33 (1997) (discussing predecessor legislative proposals that ultimately became the CTEA). See also 
Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1 (2002) (most, but not all, contributions by academic contributors to the Symposium conclude that the 
CTEA’s constitutionality is doubtful, while contributions by private attorneys representing large media 
organizations praise the statute); Symposium, An Evaluation of the Copyright Extension Act of 1995, 14 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625 (1996) (mini-symposium of three articles, each of which finds problematic the then-pending 
legislative precursors to the CTEA). See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual 
Property After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 547, 548–49 n.6 (2003) (cataloging scholars’ 
views). 
134 The language of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which empowers Congress “to promote the progress of 
science . . . by securing for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their . . . writings” (emphasis added), 
necessarily implies that Congress may fix some “limited times” for which the rights created in the exercise of this 
power endure. 
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time the CTEA was passed, particularly if those authors were already deceased.135 Because 
enlarging past copyrights could do nothing to spur the creation of new works, the retroactive 
extension of existing copyrights struck many observers as a simple giveaway to publishers and 
media companies at the expense of the public.136 Others feared that keeping works that had been 
about to become freely available for public use under copyright protection for two more decades 
would impair free expression.137 
Publisher Eric Eldred filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the CTEA. He 
argued that the statute contravened both the protections of the First Amendment (by forbidding 
expressive reuse of materials that would otherwise have been part of the public domain) and the 
“limited times” requirement of the Constitution’s intellectual property clause (by extending the 
duration of past copyrights). A district court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,138 and a 
divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed.139 With respect to the “limited times” requirement, 
the panel majority suggested that this language forbade only copyrights that were literally 
unending,140 and rejected Eldred’s argument that the Constitutional directive to “promote 
progress” circumscribed legislative authority.141 The panel further concluded that the 
                                                                    
135 See, e.g., Patry, supra note 133, at 915 (“obviously no further works can be induced”). 
136 See Arlen W. Langvardt & Kyle T. Langvardt, Unwise or Unconstitutional?: The Copyright Term Extension 
Act, the Eldred Decision, and the Freezing of the Public Domain for Private Benefit, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
193, 201–03 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 128 (2002) (“the CTEA looks like a massive giveaway of public domain resources for 
private use”) (footnote omitted); Netanel, supra note 133, at 70 (finding that CTEA gave publishers a “double 
windfall of an additional twenty years of copyright protection and, in many cases, of having acquired valuable 
copyrights for prices that did not reflect the subsequently extended term”); Patry, supra note 133, at 932–33 
(identifying beneficiaries of term extension as distributors and estates of deceased authors). Cf. Golan v. Holder, 132 
S. Ct. 873, 907 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“when a copyright law is primarily backward looking the risk is 
greater that Congress is trying to help known beneficiaries at the expense of badly organized unknown users who 
find it difficult to argue and present their case to Congress”). 
137 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protection and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright 
Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 8, 95–97 (2002); Netanel, supra note 133, at 73. 
138 Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). 
139 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
140 Id. at 377 (“If the Congress were to make copyright protection permanent, then it would surely exceed the 
power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause.”). 
141 See id. at 377–78. This portion of the majority’s argument drew a strong dissenting opinion from Judge 
Sentelle, who maintained that the language of the Constitution 
empowers the Congress to do one thing, and one thing only. That one thing is “to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts.” . . . The clause is not an open grant of 
power to secure exclusive rights. . . . 
. . . Extending existing copyrights is not promoting useful arts, nor is it securing 
exclusivity for a limited time. 
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constitutional requirement of expressive originality enunciated by the Supreme Court in Feist 
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.142 applied only to the threshold question of 
copyrightability vel non, and did not impose a further requirement that the author produce 
additional original expression to justify enlarging the term of an existing copyright.143 As to the 
free speech issue, the panel unanimously agreed that “copyrights are categorically immune from 
challenges under the First Amendment.”144 
By a 7–2 vote, the Supreme Court found the CTEA constitutional and affirmed the Court 
of Appeals’ decision.145 The majority first noted that Congress had on many prior occasions 
extended the duration of copyrights then in force, although the question whether such extensions 
complied with constitutional standards had not previously been litigated.146 Lacking relevant 
precedent in the domain of copyright law, the majority turned instead to patent law, and declared 
it relevant that “early Congresses extended the duration of numerous individual patents”147 and 
that “[t]he courts saw no ‘limited times’ impediment to such extensions[.]”148 Because Congress 
lawfully could enlarge the duration of an existing patent, the majority reasoned, it must hold 
                                                                    
Id. at 381–82 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part). Copyright scholarship has tended to validate the view that the words 
“to promote the progress of science” were intended as a substantive constraint on legislative power. See Dotan Oliar, 
Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual 
Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006); Patterson, supra note 70, at 348, 355–56; Malla Pollack, What is 
Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001); but cf. Margaret Chon, Postmodern 
Progress: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993) (suggesting that promotion 
of “Progress” as an end in itself suffers from textual indeterminacy and is historically and culturally contingent). 
142 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
143 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 376–77. 
144 Id. at 375. Commentators seemed particularly dismayed by the court’s pronouncement on this point. See, 
e.g., Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 179 (2003) (“Categorical exemption is untenable.”); L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. 
Reno: An Example of the Law of Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 227–28 (2001). For a critical 
examination of the courts’ lengthy history of denying that copyright law and free expression are in any way 
antagonistic, see Michael D. Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up, 
43 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 233 (2003). 
145 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
146 Id. at 194–96, 200–02. 
147 Id. at 201 (citing three such statutes enacted between 1808 and 1815). 
148 Id. at 202. The majority placed particular emphasis on McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843), 
which upheld the retroactive application of the provisions of a new statute to a patent issued before the statute was 
passed. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 202–04; see also McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206 (“the powers of Congress to legislate upon the 
subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as there are no restraints on its exercise, there can 
be no limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the rights of property in 
existing patents”). 
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comparable power to enlarge the duration of existing copyrights.149 Whether Congress had 
exercised that power wisely was a subject the majority declared to be essentially outside its 
purview, noting that the statute “reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes”150 and 
that the Court should “defer substantially to Congress”151 with respect to those judgments. 
Finally, the majority rejected a number of Eldred’s arguments for a narrower reading of the 
Constitution’s intellectual property clause: it declined to construe Congress’s history of repeated 
enlargements of the copyright term “as a congressional attempt to evade or override the ‘limited 
Times’ constraint”;152 agreed with the Court of Appeals that the constitutional requirement of 
original expression need not be satisfied every time Congress altered the duration of an existing 
copyright153 and that the constitutional directive to “promote Progress” did not operate as a 
constraint upon legislative authority;154 and reasoned that the quid pro quo inherent in the 
copyright system—an exchange of statutory exclusive rights in return for authors’ creation and 
dissemination of their works—did not implicitly preclude Congress from altering the scope of 
that bargain after the works were created in ways that benefited the authors concerned.155 
The Court next addressed whether the CTEA impermissibly restricted speech protected 
under the First Amendment. Focusing its attention not specifically on the CTEA but instead on 
several broader copyright doctrines, the majority declared that “copyright law contains built-in 
First Amendment accommodations” that sufficed to protect expressive reuse of copyrighted 
materials.156 These “accommodations” included, first, the idea/expression dichotomy, which 
excludes the ideas conveyed in any work from copyright protection and leaves them freely 
available for reuse by others.157 The Court found a second “accommodation” in copyright’s fair 
use doctrine, which allowed reuse of other authors’ copyrighted expression (not merely their 
ideas) in some circumstances.158 The Court also noted that the CTEA itself broadened some 
provisions of the statute that permitted certain unlicensed uses of copyrighted works.159 Although 
                                                                    
149 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204. 
150 Id. at 205. 
151 Id. at 204. 
152 Id. at 209 (footnote omitted). 
153 Compare id. at 211 with supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
154 Compare Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211–14, with supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
155 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214–15. 
156 Id. at 219 (citation omitted). 
157 Id.; cf. supra notes 62 (noting unprotectability of ideas and other non-expressive material found within 
copyrighted works), 97–103 (explaining how preserving a domain free from proprietary claims advances the 
constitutional objectives of copyright law) and accompanying text. 
158 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20. 
159 See id. at 220 (summarizing CTEA’s amendments to 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(h) & 110(5)(B)). The latter statutory 
change was subsequently determined to contravene the United States’ international treaty obligations, but remains 
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the Court rejected Eldred’s argument that the CTEA impaired free speech interests by forbidding 
expressive reuse of materials that would have entered the public domain but for the statute, it 
refused to exempt all copyright legislation from First Amendment scrutiny as the Court of 
Appeals had done, explaining that: 
The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline 
to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the 
right to make other people’s speeches. To the extent such assertions raise 
First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards are 
generally adequate to address them. We recognize that the D. C. Circuit 
spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights “categorically immune 
from challenges under the First Amendment.” But when, as in this case, 
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, 
further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.160 
Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented. Justice Stevens challenged the majority’s reliance 
on prior legislative extensions of existing patents,161 noting that the examples on which the 
majority had relied were either inapposite or rested upon principles that subsequent cases had 
declared to be unconstitutional.162 He further rejected the proposition that expanded copyright 
protection could be justified as an incentive to encourage the restoration and preservation of 
previously created works.163 Justice Stevens found that the CTEA contravened the public’s 
reliance interest in free reuse of a copyrighted work following the expiration of whatever period 
of protection initially induced the author to create that work, reasoning that: 
The reason for increasing the inducement to create something new simply 
does not apply to an already-created work. To the contrary, the equity 
argument actually provides strong support for petitioners. Members of the 
public were entitled to rely on a promised access to copyrighted or 
                                                                    
on the books at the time of this writing. See Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000). 
160 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Cf. supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text. 
162 Justice Stevens was particularly dismissive of the majority’s reliance on a series of private laws enacted 
from the late 18th to the mid-19th centuries which had retroactively extended patent protection to particular 
inventions that had already fallen into the public domain, a practice he deemed incompatible with the Court’s 
declaration in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966), that “Congress may not authorize the issuance of 
patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to 
materials already available.” See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 234–35, 237–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Congress’s pattern of 
enacting unconstitutional legislation, in Justice Stevens’s view, negated the ordinary presumption that the history of 
legislative enactments on a given subject provide clues to the limitations on Congressional power over that subject. 
See id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
163 See id. at 239–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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patented works at the expiration of the terms specified when the exclusive 
privileges were granted. On the other hand, authors will receive the full 
benefit of the exclusive terms that were promised as an inducement to 
their creativity, and have no equitable claim to increased compensation for 
doing nothing more.164 
Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the majority’s rationale necessarily implied that Congress 
could enact the functional equivalent of a perpetual copyright through repeated retroactive 
extensions of the term, an outcome he believed impossible to square both with history and with 
the Constitution’s mandate that copyright protection subsist only for a “limited Time[.]”165 And 
what the majority characterized as appropriate deference to legislative judgments as to the proper 
duration of the copyright term, Justice Stevens instead saw as abdication of the Court’s 
obligation to ensure that enacted legislation did not overstep constitutional bounds.166 
Justice Breyer’s dissent focused on the CTEA’s burdensome effects upon expression. 
Although concerns regarding legislative incursions on free expression were more often 
associated with First Amendment cases, such concerns were hardly foreign to copyright 
discourse; indeed, Justice Breyer recognized, the Supreme Court itself had linked the two, 
remarking that “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”167 In 
Justice Breyer’s view, copyright’s central aim was to foster the dissemination and reuse of 
expressive works by others in order to promote the constitutional values of “knowledge and 
learning.”168 To focus merely on the rewards that copyright provided to authors was to miss the 
point of the law, for “[t]he ‘reward’ is a means, not an end. …copyright statutes must serve 
public, not private, ends[.]”169 Justice Breyer, accordingly, proposed to evaluate whether the 
CTEA bestowed primarily private rather than public benefits, whether it risked “seriously . . . 
undermin[ing]” the public’s expressive interest in knowledge and learning, and whether it 
promoted other objectives relevant to the constitutional purpose.170 
Justice Breyer found that copyright law burdened the public’s expressive interests in at 
least two respects: by granting rewards to authors that may have been greater than necessary to 
induce creation of their work, and by requiring authors’ permission (backed up, in most cases, by 
                                                                    
164 Id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
165 See id. at 241–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting); U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
166 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. supra notes 150–151 and accompanying text. 
167 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoted in Eldred, 537 U.S. at 
244 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); but cf. supra notes 157–158 and accompanying text (finding copyright exceptions, not 
copyright protection itself, better indicative of the law’s “accommodations” with expressive interests). 
168 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
169 Id. at 245, 247 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
170 See id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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a demand for compensation) as a condition of using the work.171 Both of these factors increased 
the effective cost the public must pay to use a work, and both costs had been further increased by 
the CTEA. Because the CTEA retroactively lengthened the duration of past copyrights, however, 
Justice Breyer believed that the public would receive essentially nothing in exchange for the 
higher costs it would have to bear to use pre-existing works during the newly extended copyright 
term.172 Furthermore, the greater costs would apply not only to that subset of copyrighted works 
that had continuing commercial value, but to all works. Even works of limited commercial 
worth, however, might be of significant interest to historians, artists, teachers, and archivists—
groups whose uses of the works were most likely to yield broader social benefits. By raising the 
cost of such socially valuable uses of older copyrighted works (including the costs of locating the 
current rights holders for works created decades earlier), the CTEA significantly burdened the 
public without providing an offsetting benefit.173 
Although the majority downplayed the extent to which the CTEA impaired expressive 
interests,174 Justice Breyer found the majority’s reasoning unpersuasive. The statutory exception 
authorizing certain library copying, for example, contained so many built-in limitations and 
exceptions as to be essentially meaningless.175 And the majority’s invocation of the fair use rule 
and the idea/expression dichotomy, which it proffered as evidence of copyright’s compatibility 
with First Amendment concerns, did nothing, in Justice Breyer’s view, to “help those who wish 
to obtain from electronic databases material that is not there” due to the CTEA’s new 
restrictions.176 Justice Breyer believed that, by causing “harm to efforts to preserve and to 
disseminate works that were created long ago[,]”177 the CTEA impaired expressive reuses of 
existing works to a far greater extent than the majority recognized. 
Of course, regulations of every type impose costs and burdens on the regulated conduct. 
Justice Breyer searched in vain, however, for any broader public benefit adequate to justify the 
expressive burdens the CTEA created. Rejecting the argument that the CTEA provided an 
incentive for the creation of future expressive works, Justice Breyer argued that “[n]o potential 
                                                                    
171 See id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
172 See id. at 248–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing wealth transfer effect of statute, which he predicted 
would yield unearned windfalls to past creators). 
173 See id. at 249–52 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his opinions, Justice Breyer has mostly avoided a common 
rhetorical error made by many other judges, in which the public interest is described as merely a proxy for the 
interests of authors in controlling exploitation of their works. See, e.g., Sherwin Siy, Two Halves of the Copyright 
Bargain: Defining the Public Interest in Copyright, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 683, 684–87 (2013) (criticizing 
courts and other policy makers for conflating the two). 
174 See supra notes 156–160 and accompanying text. 
175 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 252 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)). 
176 See id. at 253 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
177 Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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author can reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will 
survive commercially long enough for the copyright extension to matter.”178 Relying on 
calculations proffered by a group of economists in an amicus brief, he estimated that “a 1% 
likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth less 
than seven cents today.”179 Justice Breyer found that the legislative record gave Congress no 
basis on which to conclude that this modest additional sum would have altered the calculus 
underlying any prospective author’s decision whether to create a work;180 and in any event, the 
benefits were too slight and speculative to offset the CTEA’s real burdens on expression.181 He 
believed that the statute’s defenders had overstated the benefits of matching the term of 
copyright in the United States to that of European nations, which had enacted a life-plus-70 term 
some years earlier.182 Justice Breyer rejected the argument that lengthening the copyright term 
would lead publishers to continue distributing the protected works, finding it incompatible with 
the constitutional purpose and unsupported by the available data.183 Finally, although recognizing 
that Congress had recently employed copyright law as a tool to advance the interests of 
American companies in international trade, Justice Breyer declared that he “f[ou]nd nothing in 
the Copyright Clause that would authorize Congress to enhance the copyright grant’s monopoly 
power, likely leading to higher prices both at home and abroad, solely in order to produce higher 
foreign earnings. … The Clause seeks public, not private, benefits.”184 
2. Kahle v. Gonzales 
Although the result in Eldred v. Ashcroft surely disappointed advocates of robust 
protections for the public domain,185 the majority opinion contained some favorable language. 
Most notably, the Supreme Court, consistent with the consensus of scholarly opinion, rejected 
the lower court’s holding that copyright statutes were immune from constitutional scrutiny under 
the First Amendment.186 Although the Court ultimately rejected Eldred’s First Amendment-based 
challenge to the CTEA, it did so on the ground that “in this case, Congress has not altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection”187—inviting the inference that if Congress did enact 
                                                                    
178 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
179 Id. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
180 See id. at 255–57 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
181 See id. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
182 See id. at 257–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
183 See id. at 260–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
184 Id. at 262–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
185 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 104, at 243–46. 
186 Compare supra note 144 and accompanying text, with supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
187 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
33
Armstrong: Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2016
 
a statute “altering” copyright’s “traditional contours,”188 First Amendment scrutiny would be 
appropriate. 
Kahle v. Gonzales189 involved a constitutional challenge to the 1998 CTEA190 and the 
1992 Copyright Renewal Act (“CRA”),191 based upon Eldred’s First Amendment rationale. The 
plaintiffs argued that both statutes dispensed with long-settled requirements that previously had 
fostered the entry of copyrighted works into the public domain, thereby altering a “traditional 
contour” of copyright protection. The “traditional contours” that Congress had changed were, 
first, the requirement that a rights holder file a renewal application to obtain copyright protection 
beyond the initial 28-year term, and second, the length of the additional term of protection 
thereby acquired. Understanding why the Kahle plaintiffs regarded these statutes as changes to 
copyright’s “traditional contours” requires a brief review of recent copyright history. 
Congress began to convert copyright from an “opt-in” to an “opt-out” system of 
protection in the Copyright Act of 1976.192 Before the 1976 Act, copyright protection extended to 
a work only if that work’s author took affirmative steps to secure such protection. The 
predecessor statute, the Copyright Act of 1909, conditioned federal copyright protection on the 
author’s publication of the work with a valid notice of copyright.193 The default position in 
copyright law thus matched that of patent law: expressive works and inventions both came into 
                                                                    
188 As Professor Netanel has noted, the Eldred Court’s reference to copyright’s “traditional contours” is quite 
opaque, and the Court’s opinion offered little guidance concerning how future courts or litigants could determine 
whether copyright legislation violated any applicable First Amendment standards. As he put it: 
[O]ur current Copyright Act provides for a far longer copyright term, grants copyright 
protection to many more types of expressive works, imposes markedly fewer 
prerequisites for enjoying copyright protection, and accords copyright holders more 
exclusive rights than did U.S. copyright law through much of the nineteenth century. 
Viewed in that light, very little of today’s Copyright Act would fall within copyright 
law’s “traditional contours.” 
Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 
1097 (2013); cf. supra note 74 and accompanying text. For attempts to give substantive content to the Court’s 
reference to “traditional contours,” see, e.g., Edward S. Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 365–68 
(2008); William McGinty, First Amendment Rights to Protected Expression: What Are the Traditional Contours of 
Copyright Law?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1099, 1119–27 (2008) (finding that the Court’s reference to “traditional 
contours” implies a predominantly historical mode of review). 
189 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007), superseding on denial of petition for rehearing en banc 474 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
190 See supra note 129. 
191 Pub. L. No. 102-307, tit. I, 106 Stat. 264, 264 (1992) [hereafter “Copyright Renewal Act”]. 
192 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C.). 
193 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075. 
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being unprotected by federal law,194 and received protection only if their respective creators 
followed the steps prescribed by statute to create enforceable rights. Authors could “opt in” to 
copyright protection by observing the required formalities upon publication of their work; 
conversely, an author’s publication of a work without complying with the applicable statutory 
formalities prevented copyright rights from attaching and effectively left the work in the public 
domain.195 
Its historical insistence that authors comply with statutory formalities (such as a valid 
notice of copyright) before protection could attach placed the United States at odds with 
international copyright law, which disallowed the setting of such preconditions to copyright 
protection.196 As the United States became a net exporter of intellectual property assets, however, 
Congress began to perceive an advantage for domestic producers in integrating the United States 
more closely into the international copyright regime.197 Many of the changes enacted in the 
Copyright Act of 1976, such as the adoption of a unitary copyright term, were justified as 
necessary to bring United States law into line with international copyright norms.198 In one of its 
most important alterations to then-existing law, the 1976 Act redefined the moment at which 
federal copyright protection attached to an expressive work: rather than requiring authors to 
publish their works and to observe certain formal requirements when doing so, the new statute 
provided that copyright protection attached to every work when “fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression.”199 By extending copyright protection automatically to every expressive work upon 
fixation, the 1976 Act effectively ended the “opt-in” federal copyright system that existed under 
the 1909 Act. 
Even the 1976 Act, however, still nominally required authors to include a notice of 
copyright when their works were published, although the statute permitted deficient notices to be 
cured during a specified period following publication.200 These remaining formal requirements 
                                                                    
194 Before the 1976 Act, expressive works were protectable by state law before publication, so the 
circumstances are admittedly not precisely parallel. The 1976 Act eliminated state-law systems of copyright 
protection for most purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
195 See generally Armstrong, supra note 77, at 388–89. 
196 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
197 For much of its early history the United States, like many other developing nations, purposefully 
maintained comparatively weak protections for intellectual property rights (especially for foreign creators) as a form 
of subsidy to domestic producers. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 34–35 (2000); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 21, 29–30 & n.42 (2004) (linking historical changes in United States copyright policy to interests of U.S. 
producers). 
198 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 135, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5751. 
199 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
200 See Armstrong, supra note 77, at 389 & nn.166–68. 
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were swept away in 1989 under the Berne Convention Implementation Act (“BCIA”).201 The 
combination of the 1976 Act’s provision recognizing copyright protection from the moment of 
fixation and the BCIA’s elimination of even those weak formal requirements that survived the 
1976 Act essentially completed the transformation of copyright in the United States from an 
“opt-in” to an “opt-out” system of protection.202 
The statutes at issue in Kahle made further alterations to the copyright system which, the 
plaintiffs contended, upset its “traditional contours.” Before the Copyright Renewal Act, the 
filing of a renewal application was necessary to extend the term of copyright in a pre-1978 work 
beyond an initial 28-year period of protection.203 The CRA eliminated this renewal requirement 
for all works that were still in their initial 28-year term of protection in 1992—which is to say, 
works published under copyright between 1964 and 1977, inclusive.204 The statute’s effect on the 
scope of the public domain was dramatic, because most authors never renewed their 
copyrights.205 Before the CRA, failure to file a renewal application left the work in the public 
domain after the initial 28-year term of protection expired.206 By making renewal automatic, the 
CRA thus extended the term of copyright for that majority of works that would otherwise have 
entered the public domain 28 years after publication.207 At the time of the CRA, the automatic 
renewal added a further 47 years to the duration of every copyright for works published between 
1964 and 1977.208 
                                                                    
201 Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) [hereafter “Berne Convention Implementation Act”]. The 
statute became effective March 1, 1989. See id. § 13(a) (codified at note following 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
202 See Armstrong, supra note 77, at 388–90. Indeed, even the “opt out” label may no longer accurately 
characterize the law, because it is uncertain under the present statutory language whether an author who wishes to 
“opt out” of copyright protection may do so. See id. at 391; but cf. supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
203 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (summarizing historical evolution of copyright duration 
rules); Martha Graham School & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 
F.3d 624, 632–33 (1st Cir. 2004) (same). 
204 Copyright Renewal Act, supra note 191, § 102(g)(2), 106 Stat. at 266 (codified at note following 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101); see also Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 2007); 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:92 (2014). 
205 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 64, at 242 & fig. 8.8 (illustrating that renewal applications were filed 
only for a minority of those works eligible for renewal); Sprigman, supra note 114, at 499 & fig. 3. 
206 See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951). 
207 See Kahle, 487 F.3d at 699. 
208 See Copyright Renewal Act, supra note 191, § 102(a), 106 Stat. at 264–65 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)). 
By automatically granting a 47-year renewal term to works created between 1964 and 1977 as to which no renewal 
application was filed, the Copyright Renewal Act extended the duration of copyright in every such work from 28 to 
a total of 75 years—effectively postponing by two generations or more the entry of such works into the public 
domain. 
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The CTEA further slowed the entry of works into the public domain by adding 20 years 
to the duration of all copyrights then in force.209 Works created between 1964 and 1977, which 
received a second copyright term automatically under the Copyright Renewal Act, received a 
second term that was even longer than the law provided at the time the works were created. This 
further restriction of copyrighted works from passing into the public domain was also the subject 
of the plaintiffs’ “traditional contours” First Amendment challenge in Kahle.210 
The Court of Appeals panel found the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges to both the 
CRA and CTEA to be foreclosed by Eldred.211 The court’s discussion of the First Amendment 
issue occupies just five paragraphs of its opinion,212 a cursory treatment that apparently rested on 
the assumption that the parallels between Eldred and the plaintiffs’ CRA and CTEA challenges 
were too obvious to require elaboration. That assumption may have been at least tolerably apt 
with respect to the Kahle plaintiffs’ CTEA challenge; the lengthening of existing copyright terms 
by 20 years survived First Amendment scrutiny in Eldred, and the same statute was at issue in 
Kahle.213 
With respect to the CRA challenge, however, the Kahle panel’s attempt to draw a parallel 
with Eldred appears more strained. The CRA, of course, was not before the Court in Eldred. In 
order to bring the CRA within the scope of the reasoning enunciated in Eldred, the Kahle panel 
had to characterize the CRA as “plac[ing] existing copyrights in parity with those of future 
works.”214 This characterization of the statute is not easily squared with its text, which expressly 
treats some past works—those published between 1964 and 1977—differently from all others,215 
                                                                    
209 See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text. 
210 See Kahle, 487 F.3d at 699–700. 
211 See id. at 698 (“The Supreme Court has already effectively addressed and denied Plaintiffs’ arguments.”). 
212 See id. at 700. 
213 See supra notes 156–160 and accompanying text. Even with respect to the CTEA challenge, however, the 
Kahle and Eldred cases are not perfect mirror images. Petitioners in Eldred nowhere addressed the question whether 
Congress had altered a “traditional contour” of copyright protection; nor could they, for the principle that changes to 
“the traditional contours of copyright protection” invite First Amendment scrutiny was coined by the Eldred 
majority itself. On this view, Kahle invited the Court of Appeals to do precisely what the majority in Eldred had not: 
namely, to give substantive content to the “traditional contours” test. Cf. supra note 188 and accompanying text. By 
instead treating the plaintiffs’ challenge as foreclosed by Eldred, the Kahle panel bypassed an opportunity to clarify 
the law. 
214 Kahle, 487 F.3d at 700; cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (noting that CTEA’s blanket 20-
year extension of all existing copyright terms “placed existing and future copyrights in parity”); id. at 196 (“in 
common with the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts, the CTEA’s new terms apply to both future and existing copyrights”). 
215 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Under the CRA, both the absolute length of the copyright term 
for 1964–1977 works, as well as the way the duration is computed, differ from the corresponding rules governing 
pre-1964 or post-1977 works. Pre-1978 works enjoy a fixed term of federal copyright protection measured from the 
date of publication (with works published in 1963 or earlier entering the public domain if their copyrights are not 
renewed after the initial 28-year term of protection), while post-1977 works enjoy a different measure of protection 
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and which contains no provisions of relevance to future works. Perhaps Kahle’s characterization 
is tolerably accurate to the extent that the CRA treated alike all works within the subset of those it 
singled out for special treatment, although even this statement is, at best, an approximation in 
view of other provisions of the CRA that extend greater protections to some 1964–1977 works 
(those in respect of which a renewal application is filed) than to others (those whose copyrights 
are automatically renewed).216 These distinctions between the claim at issue in Kahle and the 
challenge resolved by the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred passed unremarked upon in the 
Kahle panel’s exceedingly brief analysis.217 Although the plaintiffs’ CRA challenge in Kahle 
arguably warranted closer scrutiny than the court gave it, the court’s choice to frame the 
challenge as simply duplicative of the CTEA challenge rejected in Eldred effectively foreclosed 
further review.218 
The combined effects of the CRA and CTEA on the public domain warranted only 
glancing mention in the panel’s opinion. The panel recognized the extent to which the statutes 
had contributed to changing the state of play, noting that before 1978, “[t]he majority of creative 
works were … never copyrighted and only a small percentage were protected for the maximum 
term.”219 The panel further observed that “[e]liminating the renewal requirement dramatically 
increased the average copyright term and correspondingly decreased the number of works 
                                                                    
consisting of a certain number of years following the death of the author of the work. See supra notes 130–131 and 
accompanying text. Far from treating past and present works alike, the CRA expressly preserved this disparity in the 
means by which copyright terms for pre-1978 and post-1977 works are computed. 
216 See Copyright Renewal Act, supra note 191, § 102(a), 106 Stat. at 265 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 304(a)(4)(A)). Although the failure to file a copyright renewal application no longer results in the work falling into 
the public domain after the initial 28-year term of protection, it nevertheless has ongoing legal consequences. Under 
this provision of the CRA, proprietors who fail to file a copyright renewal application may no longer complain about 
licensees’ continuing exploitation of derivative works prepared during the first copyright term. In contrast, 
proprietors who do file a renewal application may avail themselves of the rule of Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 
(1990), which requires the licensee to conclude a new agreement with the copyright holder in order to continue 
exploiting a derivative work during the renewal term of the underlying copyright in some circumstances. 
217 The extension of the total duration of copyright entailed by the CRA’s elimination of the renewal 
requirement also created a quantitatively more substantial change to the total length of the copyright term than was 
before the Supreme Court in Eldred. Those 1964–1977 works for which no renewal application was filed (which is 
to say, the great majority of such works) saw their copyright terms nearly trebled under the CRA, from 28 to 75 
years. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. This extension exceeds, in both absolute terms and as a 
percentage of the unmodified original duration, the 20-year extension under the CTEA. 
218 Cf. Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary First Amendment Analysis of Legislation Treating News Aggregation as 
Copyright Infringement, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 947, 964 n.89 (2010) (“Kahle has relatively little to say about 
when a court should apply elevated First Amendment scrutiny to copyright legislation because the Ninth Circuit saw 
the case as an attempt to re-litigate Eldred. It would therefore be incorrect to read Kahle as standing for the 
proposition that all First Amendment review of copyright legislation should be deferential.”). 
219 Kahle, 487 F.3d at 699; see also supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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currently entering the public domain.”220 Nevertheless, in the panel’s view, curtailing the entry of 
formerly copyrighted works into the public domain “d[id] not require further First Amendment 
scrutiny” because “traditional First Amendment safeguards such as fair use and the 
idea/expression dichotomy are sufficient to vindicate the speech interests affected by the CRA 
and the CTEA.”221 In any event, for present purposes, the panel’s reasoning matters less than its 
result: given a choice between protecting private rights and the public domain, the panel gave the 
former greater weight. That is the same choice the Eldred majority made, even if the 
circumstances of the two cases were not quite as similar as the Kahle panel stated. 
3. Golan v. Holder 
In the last half century, Congress has acted repeatedly to bring United States intellectual 
property laws more into line with international treaties and norms.222 One such international 
treaty, the Berne Convention, required (in Article 18(1)) that member nations extend copyright 
protection “to all works which, at the moment of [the Convention’s] coming into force, have not 
yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of 
protection.”223 After the United States joined the Berne Convention effective March 1, 1989,224 
questions arose concerning whether United States law adequately protected foreign works whose 
copyrights had not yet expired in their home countries. There was reason to believe that it did 
not, for some foreign authors had been determined to have no valid United States copyrights not 
because the term of protection had expired in the author’s home country, but because of the 
author’s failure to comply with the statutory formalities that United States law required, upon 
publication, for copyright protection to attach.225 The United States Government, however, took 
the position that the obligations stated in Article 18(1) of the Berne Convention were not 
mandatory,226 and the 1988 legislation that implemented the Berne Convention specifically did 
                                                                    
220 Kahle, 487 F.3d at 699. 
221 Id. at 700 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20). 
222 See supra notes 196–202 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102 to provide that United States patents shall 
be awarded to the first inventor to file a patent application, the priority rule that other nations have long applied). 
223 Berne Convention, supra note 115, Art. 18(1). The Convention also provides, in Article 18(2), that member 
nations are not required to extend copyright protection to any work that had already entered the public domain in 
that nation through expiration of the copyright term. See id. Art. 18(2). 
224 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
225 See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 427 & n.4 (Cal. 1979) (noting that Bram Stoker’s 
1897 novel Dracula, although validly copyrighted in the author’s home country of England until 1962 (50 years 
after the author’s death), had always been in the public domain in the United States due to the author’s 
noncompliance with the deposit requirement of United States copyright law). 
226 H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 51 (1988) (“there is considerable debate over whether any recognition of the 
‘principle’ of Article 18(1) of the Convention is absolutely required in light of the sweeping discretion accorded 
states by Article 18(3)”); see also Library of Congress, Copyright Office, Final Regulation, Restoration of Certain 
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not extend copyright protection to “any work that is in the public domain in the United 
States.”227 The nation’s failure to extend copyright protection to all foreign authors whose works 
remained under copyright in their home countries was a source of lingering tension in the United 
States’ relations with its trading partners.228 
The completion of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations229 in 1994 
brought a commitment by the United States to several new treaties. Most prominent for present 
purposes was the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”), which for the first time brought the rules of intellectual property under the umbrella 
of the global trade system.230 Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement provided, in part, that 
“[m]ember nations shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and 
the Appendix thereto.”231 This language raised renewed questions about the United States’ 
adherence to Article 18(1) of the Berne Convention and its mandate to extend copyright 
protection to works of foreign authors whose copyrights in their home countries had not yet 
expired. Abandoning the pretense that such provisions were merely optional, the United States 
moved swiftly to amend its copyright statutes to bring itself more fully into compliance with the 
Berne Convention. 
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”)232 amended the copyright 
statute to provide for the “restoration” of United States copyright protection in foreign works that 
had previously lost United States copyright protection for specified reasons other than the 
expiration of copyright in the author’s home country. Specifically, the statute identified as 
eligible for restoration of United States copyright protection those works of foreign authors that 
were in the public domain due to noncompliance with formalities, failure to renew, lack of 
proper copyright notice, failure to observe manufacturing requirements, lack of subject matter 
                                                                    
Berne and WTO Works, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,414, 50,416 (Sept. 29, 1995) (“The United States arguably failed to 
conform its law fully to the Berne Convention in 1989 when it declined to interpret Article 18(1) on restoration as 
being mandatory.”) (footnote omitted). 
227 See Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 201, § 12, 102 Stat. at 2860 (codified at note 
following 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
228 See, e.g., Thomas Gordon Kennedy, Note, GATT-Out of the Public Domain: Constitutional Dimensions of 
Foreign Copyright Restoration, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 545, 553–54 (1996); Paul J. Sleven & Eric J. 
Weisberg, GATT Implementation Bill Restores Copyright in Foreign Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 272, 
272–73 (1995). 
229 See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
(1996). 
230 An overview of the TRIPS Agreement is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (visited May 1, 2014). The text of the agreement 
is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereafter “TRIPS Agreement”]. 
231 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 230, Art. 9(1). 
232 Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81 (1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012)). 
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protection (only with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings), or lack of national eligibility.233 The 
statute specifically denied restoration of United States copyright protection to any foreign work 
that was “in the public domain in its source country through expiration of term of 
protection[.]”234 Those foreign works which qualified for restoration of copyright protection 
received a new United States copyright beginning (in general) on January 1, 1996,235 and 
thereafter “subsist[ing] for the remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have 
otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entered the public domain in the 
United States.”236 In recognition of the fact that some United States users of foreign copyrighted 
works may have relied to their detriment on the fact that those works were in the public domain 
in the United States, the URAA shielded such users from liability for copyright infringement if 
they discontinued any infringing activity within twelve months after the publication of a notice 
by the foreign author of a restored work that the author intended to enforce her copyright.237 The 
URAA also created a compulsory license scheme permitting derivative works based upon any 
foreign restored work to continue to be exploited so long as “reasonable compensation” was paid 
to the foreign author.238 Neither URAA provision aimed ostensibly at protecting parties who had 
relied on the public domain status of restored works, however, permitted continued use of such 
works without the payment of a royalty. 
Because the URAA effectively removed expressive works from the public domain and 
forbid them to be used without payment to a private party, it raised substantial questions 
concerning legislative power. Indeed, in Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court had 
suggested that any law diminishing the public domain would exceed the bounds of 
Congressional power under the Constitution’s Progress Clause. There, the Court wrote: 
[T]he federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision 
. . . which authorizes the Congress “To promote the Progress of . . . useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is both a grant of power 
and a limitation . . . . The Congress in the exercise of the patent power 
                                                                    
233 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C) (2012) (defining “restored work”). 
234 Id. § 104A(h)(6)(B) (emphasis added). 
235 See id. § 104A(a)(1)(A) (“Copyright subsists, in accordance with this section, in restored works, and vests 
automatically on the date of restoration.”), (h)(2) (defining “date of restoration” as January 1, 1996, if the foreign 
author’s home country was on that date a party to the Berne Convention or a member country of the WTO; or as a 
later date when either of those conditions became effective with respect to the author’s home country). Section 
104A(g) empowered the President of the United States to declare that particular foreign countries had become 
eligible for restoration of their authors’ copyrights in the United States. 
236 Id. § 104A(a)(1)(B). 
237 Id. § 104A(d)(2), (e). 
238 Id. § 104A(d)(3). See generally Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 554–55 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (explaining operation of URAA’s provisions on restoration of copyright in foreign works). 
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may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional 
purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the 
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, 
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to 
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free 
access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and 
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in 
a patent system which by constitutional command must “promote the 
Progress of . . . useful Arts.” This is the standard expressed in the 
Constitution and it may not be ignored.239 
This suggestion that the borders of the public domain are guarded by interests of constitutional 
magnitude could have been read to suggest a basis for striking down Section 514 of the URAA, 
insofar as that statute expressly extended copyright protection to works that had for many years 
been in the public domain in the United States (although copyrighted elsewhere). 
A group of plaintiffs who contended that their livelihoods depended upon continued free 
use of foreign restored works filed a lawsuit challenging Section 514 on constitutional grounds. 
Upholding the statute, a district court determined that the above-quoted language from Graham 
v. John Deere was irrelevant where Congress removed copyrightable expression, rather than 
patentable knowledge, from the public domain, and where Congress had previously sought to 
close perceived gaps in federal copyright protection after the fact.240 The court also rejected 
plaintiffs’ contention that Section 514 unconstitutionally burdened free expression, although it 
did so essentially without analysis, simply declaring it to be a “settled rule that private censorship 
via copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns.”241 
A court of appeals panel reversed and remanded, finding that the URAA presented 
troubling First Amendment issues that could not be dismissed as easily as the district court 
suggested.242 Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred, the panel reasoned that copyright 
legislation invites First Amendment scrutiny if it “altered the traditional contours of copyright 
                                                                    
239 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (footnote omitted, first emphasis added); see also, e.g., 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“that which is in the public domain cannot be removed 
therefrom by action of the States”). This is the principle, recall, that Justice Stevens deemed incompatible with the 
majority’s reasoning in Eldred. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
240 Golan v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 914754, **5, 14 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005) (“On the whole, Congress has 
historically demonstrated little compunction about removing copyrightable materials from the public domain.”). 
241 Id. at *17 (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Curiously, the district court’s opinion 
took no account of the fact that the Supreme Court had expressly disapproved of Eldred v. Reno on this very point. 
See supra notes 144, 160 and accompanying text. 
242 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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protection.”243 In contrast to the Kahle panel, the Golan panel sought to give substantive content 
to the “traditional contours” test. The panel reasoned that the reference to “tradition” suggested 
that “Congress’s historical practice with respect to copyright and the public domain must inform 
our inquiry.”244 That historical practice, in the panel’s view, revealed a consistent “copyright 
sequence” recognized by every statute prior to the URAA: “[a] work progressed from 1) 
creation, 2) to copyright, 3) to the public domain.”245 By reversing the second and third steps, the 
panel believed, the URAA altered the “bedrock principle . . . that works in the public domain 
remain there[.]”246 The panel supported its historical understanding of the traditional copyright 
sequence by referring to many cases standing for the general proposition that copyright 
protection cannot extend to material in the public domain.247 Turning next to the history of the 
copyright statutes, the panel found therein no evidence of a “tradition of removing works from 
the public domain.”248 The historical record surrounding the Copyright Act of 1790 was too 
muddled to support definitive conclusions one way or the other.249 Nor did the panel regard it as 
significant that Congress had occasionally conferred copyrights on authors in private acts,250 or 
that Congress had given some foreign authors the power to correct deficient formalities when the 
ordinary deposit procedure was disrupted by the two world wars.251 Finding that plaintiffs’ rights 
to engage in artistic expression encompassed “a First Amendment interest in using works in the 
public domain,”252 an interest arguably impaired by the URAA and not adequately protected by 
what the Supreme Court labeled the “built-in free speech safeguards” of copyright law,253 the 
panel remanded the case to the district court to conduct a new First Amendment analysis under 
proper standards. 
                                                                    
243 Id. at 1187 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003)) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
244 Id. at 1189. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 1187. 
247 See id. at 1189–90. 
248 Id. at 1191. 
249 Id. at 1190–91; see also id. at 1191 (“the answer to the question of whether Congress thought it was 
removing works from the public domain [at the time of the 1790 Act] is probably not just unclear but also 
unknowable.”). 
250 Id. (“Far from providing evidence that copyrighting works in the public domain is within the traditional 
contours of copyright protection, the fact that individuals were forced to resort to the uncommon tactic of petitioning 
Congress demonstrates that this practice was outside the normal practice.”). 
251 See id. at 1191–92. 
252 Id. at 1193. 
253 Id. at 1194 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (internal quotations omitted)). 
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On remand, the district court struck down the statute.254 Because the parties agreed that 
the URAA imposed a content-neutral restriction on speech, the district court asked whether the 
statute “advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech 
and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.”255 The 
court accepted the government’s argument that the URAA was enacted to bring the United States 
into compliance with the Berne Convention.256 Although the statute protected the plaintiffs’ 
interests in expressive reuse of foreign works insofar as it gave them the right to continue 
exploiting such works during the one-year window following the filing of a restoration notice by 
a foreign copyright holder, and to continued exploitation of a derivative work indefinitely upon 
payment of a licensing fee,257 the district court believed that these protections still “le[ft] 
unprotected a substantial amount of speech not tied to the Government’s interest.”258 The district 
court then noted that the Berne Convention appeared to grant member nations great discretion in 
determining how, and upon what conditions, to recognize copyrights in works of foreign authors 
that were still copyrighted in those authors’ home countries.259 Rather than taking advantage of 
that discretion to preserve the plaintiffs’ reliance interests in reusing public-domain works, 
however, Congress legislated those interests out of existence. Because the URAA “suppresses 
the right of reliance parties to use works they exploited while the works were in the public 
                                                                    
254 Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009). 
255 Id. at 1170 (quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
256 See id. at 1172; see also supra notes 223, 231 and accompanying text. 
257 See Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1173; see also supra notes 237–238 and accompanying text. 
258 Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 256) (internal quotations omitted). 
259 As already noted, Article 18(1) of the Berne Convention required member nations to extend copyright 
protection “to all works which . . . have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through the 
expiry of the term of protection.” See supra note 223 and accompanying text. The Berne Convention further 
provided, however, that in the absence of contrary agreements between member nations, “the respective countries 
shall determine, each in so far as it is concerned, the conditions of application of this principle.” Berne Convention, 
supra note 115, Art. 18(3). Before the URAA, the United States’ position was that this language essentially excused 
it from complying with Article 18(1). See supra note 226 and accompanying text. Although the subsequent TRIPS 
Agreement appeared to impose a stricter obligation on member nations (see supra note 231 and accompanying text), 
the district court believed that considerable discretion remained: 
I read Article 18, Section 3, as a grant of discretion to member nations to implement the 
Berne Convention’s directive—that the copyrights of foreign authors be restored so long 
as the term of copyright protection in the country of origin has not expired—in light of 
each member nation’s established corpus of copyright law. Such discretion is not limited 
by Article 18, Section 3, so long as the directive is applied within the bounds of existing 
law. In the United States, for example, it is not disputed that the restored copyrights must 
still be subject to the well-established First Amendment exceptions afforded by the fair-
use doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy. 
Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (citations omitted). 
44
University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/1
 
domain,” it was “substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest” in 
complying with the requirements of the Berne Convention.260 Finally, the district court rejected, 
as unsubstantiated by the evidence, two further justifications the government articulated in 
support of the statute—namely, that adherence to Article 18(1) was required in order to secure 
similar protection for United States authors in the copyright laws of other nations, and that the 
URAA served to correct historically inequitable treatment of foreign authors in the United 
States.261 
A different panel of the court of appeals reversed and upheld the statute.262 After 
reviewing the history of the URAA and the course of the litigation to date, the panel turned to the 
question whether the “restoration” of foreign copyrights under Section 514 violated the First 
Amendment.263 As the district court had, the panel found that Section 514 imposed a content-
neutral regulation of speech and that intermediate scrutiny was proper.264 The panel viewed the 
governmental interests at stake in enacting the URAA quite differently from the district court, 
however. The district court had determined that the only cognizable interest the government had 
shown to underlie Section 514 was the interest in adhering to international treaty commitments, 
while rejecting the government’s assertions that the statute also served to protect American 
authors in other countries and to correct historical inequities.265 In contrast, the court of appeals 
found the government’s interest in protecting the interests of American authors overseas to be 
well established and essentially case-dispositive.266 
The panel stumbled at first in suggesting that American authors actually have a 
constitutional right to copyright protection;267 a proposition that, if read literally, would 
undermine long-settled precedents establishing that federal copyright protection exists as a 
matter of legislative grace.268 Even if the interests the statute sought to protect were not of 
                                                                    
260 Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
261 See id. at 1175–77; cf. supra note 197 and accompanying text (noting history of disparate treatment of 
domestic and foreign works under United States law). 
262 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010). Judge Briscoe was a member of the panel that had 
remanded the case to the district court in 2007, and wrote the panel’s opinion when the case returned to the Tenth 
Circuit in 2010. 
263 See id. at 1080–82. 
264 Id. at 1083; see also supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra notes 256, 261 and accompanying text. 
266 See Golan, 609 F.3d at 1083 (“We hold that the government has demonstrated a substantial interest in 
protecting American copyright holders’ interests abroad, and Section 514 is narrowly tailored to advance that 
interest.”). 
267 See id. at 1084 (“Although plaintiffs have First Amendment interests, so too do American authors.”). 
268 See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 
(1932) (“the Congress did not sanction an existing right but created a new one”); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, 
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constitutional magnitude, however, the panel found persuasive evidence in the legislative record 
that the national interest was impaired by the underprotection of American works in overseas 
markets.269 Because foreign governments had insisted upon full compliance with the Berne 
Convention by the United States as a condition of extending comparable copyright protections to 
American authors, the panel continued, Congress reasonably could have concluded that enacting 
Section 514 would lead to corresponding improvements in the protection of United States works 
abroad.270 
The panel next determined that the statute was not broader than necessary to achieve the 
government’s purpose. As the panel saw it, the burdens Section 514 imposed upon American 
users of foreign copyrighted works mirrored those Congress hoped foreign nations would impose 
on users of United States works, and that the legislative purpose would therefore be frustrated if 
those burdens were not imposed.271 The panel gave no weight to the plaintiffs’ contention, which 
the district court had judged highly significant, that the Berne Convention permitted each 
member nation to exercise a great deal of discretion in choosing how to implement its 
obligations under Article 18. In the panel’s view, that contention presupposed that achieving 
Berne compliance was the only goal of the URAA, whereas the panel saw the statute as aimed 
more broadly at serving the interests of American authors in overseas markets.272 The fact that 
other nations had achieved Berne compliance while protecting the interests of parties who had 
relied on the public domain status of foreign works did not demonstrate that Section 514 was 
insufficiently tailored because the intermediate scrutiny standard of review did not require the 
government to use the least restrictive means available.273 Because the statute advanced a 
                                                                    
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 198 (1968) (“The idea that pervades the statute [the Copyright Act of 1790] 
is that copyright is a government grant, a statutory privilege—not a right.”); id. at 201–02 (noting that this 
characterization has been carried forward into subsequent legislation); Gordon, supra note 125, at 1535 (“Judges 
have failed to use the First Amendment to provide extensive protection for free expression in intellectual property 
cases, in part because they mistakenly find a warrant for strong ‘authors’ rights’ in a philosophy of natural law.”); 
Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of “Fair Use” in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 790, 
791–92 (1975) (“A long and uninterrupted line of cases holds unequivocally that, apart from common law protection 
for unpublished works, copyright protection is completely and solely a statutory matter and that copyright is . . . 
simply a creature of statute, wholly a matter of congressional discretion to grant or to withhold”) (footnotes 
omitted). But cf. John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
465 (2005) (arguing that emergence of fair use doctrine beginning in the mid-19th century began to reintroduce 
considerations of natural rights into copyright despite earlier cases’ suggestions that the subject is wholly statutory). 
269 See Golan, 609 F.3d at 1084–86. 
270 Id. at 1086–90. 
271 Id. at 1090–91. 
272 Id. at 1091–92; cf. supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
273 See Golan, 609 F.3d at 1092. The panel also disputed the premise of the challengers’ argument, finding that 
even other nations’ protections for reliance parties were qualified and conditional and did not more expansively 
protect speech than did the URAA. See id. at 1093. 
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substantial governmental interest without burdening substantially more speech than necessary, 
the panel concluded, the URAA survived First Amendment scrutiny.274 
The Supreme Court affirmed by a 6–2 vote.275 Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg 
rejected constitutional challenges grounded both in the Progress Clause and the First 
Amendment. As to the former, the majority in Golan offered essentially the same rhetorical 
rebuff to the petitioners’ argument as the Court of Appeals had in Kahle: Justice Ginsburg 
declared that the challenge to Congress’s power to remove copyrighted works from the public 
domain was largely foreclosed by the Court’s conclusion in Eldred that Congress may lawfully 
extend the duration of existing copyrights.276 The majority also relied on the Copyright Act of 
1790 and several private bills to support its contention that “[h]istorical practice” validated 
legislative removal of expressive works from the public domain.277 The majority also analogized 
to a series of cases decided in the early to mid-19th century which had upheld the grant of patent 
rights to inventions that had previously lost such protection, and rejected the suggestion that the 
Court’s later assertion in Graham that “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents 
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain” cast doubt on the 
ongoing validity of those earlier precedents.278 Finally, the majority reiterated that the 
constitutional directive that copyright legislation “promote Progress” did not require that all 
copyright statutes must lead to the creation of new expressive works; rather, Congress could 
choose instead to “promote Progress” by rewarding publishers of past works.279 
The majority turned next to the First Amendment issue. Unlike both lower courts, the 
Supreme Court devoted no attention to the question of which First Amendment standard of 
review applied.280 Instead, the Golan majority found in Eldred a broad level of tolerance for 
                                                                    
274 Id. at 1094. 
275 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). Justice Kagan recused herself. See id. 
276 See id. at 884 (“Our decision in Eldred is largely dispositive of petitioners’ limited-time argument.”); cf. 
supra notes 211–218 and accompanying text. 
277 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 885–86; cf. supra notes 249–250 and accompanying text. 
278 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 886–87 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). Cf. supra notes 
162, 239 and accompanying text. The majority’s treatment of Graham is particularly unsatisfying insofar as the 
majority recast language that by its express terms at least purported to describe the outermost reach of legislative 
power under the Progress Clause and instead declared that it “did not speak to the constitutional limits on Congress’ 
copyright and patent authority.” Compare Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 202 n.7 
(2003)), with supra note 239 and accompanying text; see also Robert F. Kappers, Note, Is What You Give, Really 
What You Get? The Effect of Golan v. Holder on the Deterioration of the Public Domain, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1053, 
1073 (2013). 
279 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887–89; see also supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 255, 264 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Margot Kaminski, Copyright Crime and 
Punishment: The First Amendment’s Proportionality Problem, 73 MD. L. REV. 587, 600 (2013) (“Functionally, 
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legislation that burdens the reuse of copyrighted works, because such burdens increase the 
incentives for such works to be created and distributed in the first place.281 And while the Court 
in Eldred had seemingly identified the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine 
merely as illustrative examples of copyright law’s “built-in First Amendment 
accommodations,”282 in Golan, those two doctrines crystallized into the only exceptions to 
copyright protection that the First Amendment required Congress to honor.283 
The majority next considered whether the petitioners’ own long-term use of formerly 
public-domain works carried any constitutional weight. The Court’s answer to that question was 
to declare that no one has any property right in a work in the public domain,284 and therefore, no 
one suffers a deprivation of a right when formerly public domain works are converted into 
private property. In the majority’s words: “[a]nyone has free access to the public domain, but no 
one, after the copyright term has expired, acquires ownership rights in the once-protected 
works.”285 Moreover, the majority insisted, access to the restored works upon payment of a 
license fee to the new proprietor was a constitutionally adequate replacement for the free access 
that the petitioners had enjoyed before the enactment of the URAA.286 The inability to locate the 
                                                                    
Eldred and Golan put most copyright regulations outside of First Amendment protection, as though copyright 
questions were an unprotected category of speech.”) (footnote omitted). 
281 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889–90. As already noted, the Court has been somewhat inconsistent in its 
statements as to whether copyright protection itself, or exceptions and limitations upon copyright holders’ exclusive 
rights, better serve the goals of promoting free expression. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. Golan 
offers little clarity on this point except to repeat that the Framers “saw copyright as an ‘engine of free expression[.]’” 
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). 
282 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20; see also supra notes 157–158 and accompanying text; Birnhack, supra note 
144, at 279–82 (recognizing these doctrines as necessary, but not sufficient, protections for expressive interests). 
283 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91 (“Section 514 leaves undisturbed the ‘idea/expression’ distinction and the 
‘fair use’ defense.”). 
284 Cf., e.g., John J. Sierotnik, Note, Golan v. Holder, the Copyright Clause, and the Changing Public Policy 
Underlying Copyright Law in the United States, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 411, 427–28 (2014) 
(noting debate before the URAA over whether the “public domain” might be characterized as property jointly owned 
by everyone). 
285 Id. at 892. The majority’s choice of language is puzzling; after all, enabling foreign authors to “acquire 
ownership rights” over formerly public-domain works was the avowed purpose and effect of the URAA, and the 
Golan petitioners’ complaint was that, after the statute, they no longer enjoyed the “free access to the public 
domain” as it existed before the enactment of Section 514. The essence of the challenge raised in Golan was that the 
URAA upended the very system the majority described for all foreign works that had entered the public domain in 
the United States for any reason other than through the expiration of the statutory term of protection. 
286 See id. at 893 (noting that even after the passage of the URAA, formerly public-domain works may 
continue to be used so long as “the right to [do so is] obtained in the marketplace”). 
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authors of some works in order to conclude a license would be unfortunate, in the majority’s 
view, but problems of that type were for Congress, not the Court, to remedy.287 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, dissented. Whereas Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Eldred had rested predominantly on First Amendment concerns,288 in Golan his arguments were 
grounded almost exclusively on the Progress Clause.289 In Justice Breyer’s view, the pertinent 
standard by which to ascertain whether copyright legislation “promote[d] the progress of 
science”290 lay in determining whether it encouraged the production of new expressive works.291 
The works to which the URAA applied, however, consisted almost entirely of works whose 
publication preceded the statute’s enactment, making it virtually impossible for the URAA to 
spur new creative production.292 Although the statute could do nothing to stimulate new 
expression, its effects on the “millions” of past works to which it applied293 were pernicious: the 
statute would remove such works from the public domain and require would-be users of the 
works to locate and identify the foreign copyright holder (a potentially costly undertaking, 
especially for older works) and to negotiate individually for a license.294 The administrative costs 
alone of complying with the statute, in Justice Breyer’s view, would deter many uses of the 
works to which the statute applied, including uses for socially beneficial purposes such as 
archiving and education.295 Still more serious was the statute’s upsetting of the settled 
                                                                    
287 See id. at 893–94. 
288 See supra notes 167–177 and accompanying text. 
289 While noting the existence of expressive harms caused by the statute, Justice Breyer gave them little 
independent weight. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 907–08 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“For present purposes, I need not 
decide whether the harms to [speech-related] interest[s] show a violation of the First Amendment. I need only point 
to the importance of interpreting the Constitution as a single document—a document that we should not read as 
setting the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment at cross-purposes.”). 
290 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
291 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 899 (“In this sense, a copyright is, in Macaulay’s words, a ‘tax on readers for the 
purpose of giving a bounty to writers’—a bounty designed to encourage new production”) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
id. at 903 (“text, history, and precedent demonstrate that the Copyright Clause places great value on the power of 
copyright to elicit new production”) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
292 See id. at 903–04 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
293 See id. at 904 (noting estimates of number of foreign works whose copyrights would come into force in the 
United States under Section 514). 
294 See id. at 904–06 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
295 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Of course, at least some of the socially beneficial uses that Justice Breyer 
feared would be curtailed under the statute might nevertheless be excused under the fair use doctrine. See, e.g., 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 
282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Nevertheless, the unpredictability of fair use in practice may deter some lawful uses. See 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565 
n.66 (2008) (“Indeed, the very unpredictability of fair use outcomes may lead defendants to settle”); William W. 
Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1693–95 (1988). 
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expectations of users who had relied on the public-domain status of the restored works but would 
now be compelled to pay for the privilege of continuing to use such works.296 
The dissent also read the historical record quite differently from the majority. Unlike the 
CTEA (which was at issue in Eldred) and the other statutes on which the majority relied, the 
URAA contained no provisions of general applicability to future works.297 Although Eldred 
stood for the proposition that Congress lawfully may maintain parity by applying the same 20-
year term extension to both past and future copyrights alike, Justice Breyer saw nothing therein 
that supported singling out past works for uniquely advantageous treatment. He labeled 
“somewhat farfetched” the majority’s analogy to “private bills, statutes retroactively granting 
protection in wartime, or the like.”298 Rather, on Justice Breyer’s reading of the record, prior to 
the URAA, Congress had enacted “a virtually unbroken string of legislation preventing the 
withdrawal of works from the public domain.”299 And although the majority had suggested that 
Congress could reasonably conclude that providing new incentives for the dissemination of past 
works would ultimately serve the constitutional objective,300 Justice Breyer rejoined that 
extending copyright protection to a formerly public-domain work was more likely to limit than to 
enhance the availability of that work to the public.301 Finally, echoing some of the criticisms 
articulated in the district court’s opinion on remand, Justice Breyer found that the putative 
conflict between the URAA and the requirements of the Constitution was essentially a problem 
the Government had brought upon itself by failing to exercise the Berne Convention’s provided 
flexibilities to protect the reliance interests of users of public-domain works.302 
                                                                    
296 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (complaining that the URAA “reverses the payment 
expectations of those who used, or intended to use, works that they thought belonged to them”). Justice Breyer 
believed that this problem was simply not considered by Congress at the time it enacted the URAA. See id. at 907 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that “Congress, with one minor exception, heard testimony only from the 
representatives of existing copyright holders, who hoped that passage of the statute would enable them to benefit 
from reciprocal treatment of American authors abroad”). 
297 See id. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The [URAA] grants its ‘restored copyright[s]’ only to works already 
produced. It provides no monetary incentive to produce anything new.”). 
298 Id. at 909 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
299 Id. (citations omitted). 
300 See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
301 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 909–10 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 910 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This 
argument, whatever its intrinsic merits, is an argument that directly concerns a private benefit: how to obtain more 
money from the sales of existing products. It is not an argument about a public benefit, such as how to promote or to 
protect the creative process.”). Some research has offered support for Justice Breyer’s view that public domain 
works are more widely available for public use. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things 
Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1, 22–23 (2013); Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared (Illinois Public Law Research Paper 
No. 13-54, July 5, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290181. 
302 See id. at 911–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. supra notes 259–260 and accompanying text. 
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Golan is a remarkable decision for many reasons. Considered together with Eldred and 
Kahle, it marks the third consecutive (and potentially most consequential) defeat for parties 
seeking to preserve the public domain against encroachment by proprietary claims. The fact that 
the decision upheld a statute that effectively took property that was already freely available for 
public use and instead converted that same property for private financial benefit led Duke Law 
School’s Center for the Study of the Public Domain to sound this note of alarm: 
What are the limits on this decision? Could Congress recall the works of 
Shakespeare, Plato, Mozart and Melville from the public domain, and 
create new legalized monopolies over them? It is hard to imagine anything 
more contrary to the First Amendment—would privatizing Shakespeare by 
government decree abridge freedom of speech?—or to the attitudes of 
those who penned the Copyright Clause that limits Congress’s power to 
create new exclusive rights. Yet if one reads Golan, one searches in vain 
for any limiting principle on Congress’s actions. In this decision, Justice 
Ginsburg’s majority opinion effectively denies the public domain any 
meaningful Constitutional protection. Under the U.S. Constitution, says 
this case, the public domain is “public” only by sufferance. It may be 
privatized at any moment, at the whim of the Congress and without 
violating the Bill of Rights.303 
Moreover, in both Golan and Eldred, the Court rebuffed First Amendment challenges to 
copyright legislation without even specifying the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny, 
effectively carving out a special exemption from ordinary First Amendment analysis that 
seemingly applies only in copyright cases.304 
Most fundamentally, Golan rests upon a crabbed and outdated understanding of the 
public domain. Of the four interests served by a robust public domain that were sketched out 
above,305 only the third—emphasizing the public domain’s function as a repository of scientific 
truth and factual matter—receives even glancing recognition in Golan, through the majority’s 
                                                                    
303Center for the Study of the Public Domain, Duke Law School, The Incredible Shrinking Public Domain, at 
https://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/publicdomainday/2013/shrinking (last visited July 14, 2014); see also ROBERT SPOO, 
WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING, AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 266–68 (2013) (discussing “startling” 
implications of Golan majority’s rhetoric, which makes it “hard to imagine any limit to what Congress might choose 
to withdraw from the endangered commons”). 
304 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1115–27 
(2010) (criticizing Court’s “copyright exceptionalism”); see also supra note 125 and accompanying text. Of course, 
validly enacted federal legislation, including the CTEA and URAA, enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. See, 
e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). Both Eldred and Golan go quite a bit further, however, in 
presuming that speech-regulating legislation need not be subjected to First Amendment analysis at all if enacted in 
the exercise of Congress’s copyright power. 
305 See supra notes 75–106 and accompanying text. 
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insistence that Congress preserve the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use rule.306 One 
searches the Golan majority’s opinion in vain for any glimmer of Judge Kozinski’s recognition 
that restricting the public domain threatens creativity, or Judge Posner’s concern that allowing 
the heirs of long-dead authors to extract excessive tolls from tomorrow’s creators impoverishes 
us all.307 Would-be reusers of public domain material appear to the Golan majority as ungrateful 
freeloaders who believe that the Constitution entitles them to something for nothing. This is a 
vision unmoored from over two decades’ worth of consistent, high-quality scholarship on the 
actual value of the public domain. 
And so, in a nutshell, stands the fundamental issue dividing contemporary copyright law 
from the broadest strands in the consensus of expert opinion. Although most serious copyright 
scholarship engages, because it must, with the actual collection of treaties, statutes, and court 
decisions that govern the subject, the evidence and arguments that have apparently moved 
Congress and the courts to act strike most scholars as unpersuasive. For their part, Congress and 
the courts have seemed to be ignorant of, or even hostile to, the careful and thorough legal 
literature on the public domain that has blossomed in recent decades. Copyright law and 
copyright scholarship are conducting dueling monologues, not a dialogue, on the public domain. 
B. Preserving the Public Domain 
Examples of courts and policy-makers acknowledging the value and importance of the 
public domain, and the risks of construing copyright law in a fashion that cedes too much control 
over the developing information ecosystem to past publishers of expressive works, are more 
difficult to locate. When courts speak of the public domain in copyright cases, they typically do 
so only by way of fixing the outer boundary of the copyright holder’s proprietary claims, rather 
than as an independent corpus of creative material that deserves support and protection.308 
Nevertheless, although the overall trend remains strongly in the direction of greater proprietary 
control, other strands of argument do appear from time to time. The examples of Judges Kozinski 
and Posner emphasizing the importance of preserving the public domain against excessive 
proprietary incursion have already been mentioned,309 as has Justice Brandeis’s admonition that 
                                                                    
306 See supra note 283 and accompanying text. Although the Court’s reference to the fair use doctrine might be 
taken as an effort to accommodate interests beyond mere reuse of factual matter, the fair use doctrine offers less than 
meets the eye here. The possibility that an accused infringer may ultimately prevail on a fair use defense (after being 
put to the burden of litigating the issue in circumstances where the outcome may not reliably be predicted, see supra 
note 295) entails materially greater risk to the would-be fair user than does the use of public domain materials as to 
which no infringement claim may be brought at all. 
307 See supra notes 86, 87 and accompanying text. 
308 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
309 See supra note 307 and accompanying text. Of course, in the cases cited, only Judge Posner’s opinion 
commanded a majority; Judge Kozinski was dissenting from a decision which found that an electronics 
manufacturer’s print advertisement potentially violated California’s right of publicity law even though the claim was 
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“the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—
become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”310 
The copyright debate briefly spilled over into the realm of American partisan politics 
recently, doubtlessly exposing at least some observers to the competing arguments for the first 
time. In late 2012, the House Republican Study Committee issued a report entitled “Three Myths 
About Copyright Law and Where to Start to Fix It.”311 Consistent with the partisan orientation of 
the organization that issued the report, the author attacked what he characterized as “three 
myths” that had produced copyright rules at variance with American conservative political 
principles. The substance of the report’s critique, however, would be familiar to scholars across 
the political spectrum. The report argued that (1) copyright law had become inordinately focused 
upon providing financial returns to content producers rather than upon maximizing creativity and 
innovation; (2) the law contravened free-market principles by establishing a heavily regulated, 
government-provided monopoly; and (3) copyright law in practice slowed, rather than 
accelerated, creative output, scientific inquiry, digital preservation, added-value industries, and 
legitimate journalism and oversight.312 The report argued that the ever-lengthening terms of 
copyright (of the type the Supreme Court had upheld in Eldred) harmed knowledge and learning 
by barring free reuse of most works published during the last ninety years.313 Keeping all such 
works out of the public domain, the report argued, also discouraged the development of new 
industries and technologies to access, annotate, and share such works.314 
Although commentators across the political spectrum praised the report,315 it was 
withdrawn only one day later due to pressure from the content industries, and its author lost his 
job.316 Again, the report reflected only the views of an individual House staffer and its 
recommendations have not formed the basis for any legislative proposals. But the now-
withdrawn report nevertheless illustrates how the past generation of scholarship on the necessity 
of protecting the public domain may exert at least some influence among policy makers. 
                                                                    
filed by an actor who did not actually appear in the advertisement. See White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971 
F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993). 
310 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoted 
supra note 63 and accompanying text). 
311 Although the report was swiftly withdrawn by the Republican Study Committee, it was later published by 
the House staffer who wrote it. See Derek Khanna, Republican Study Committee Policy Brief: Three Myths About 
Copyright Law and Where to Start to Fix It, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2013). 
312 See id. at 3–7. 
313 Id. at 6. 
314 Id. at 7. 
315 See Derek Khanna, Reflection on the House Republican Study Committee Copyright Report, 32 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 12–14 (2013). 
316 See id. at 14–15. 
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V. Can Copyright Reform Succeed? 
In antitrust law, criticism of what scholars perceived to be consumer-unfriendly liability 
rules led to a wholesale transformation of legal doctrine along the lines that the critics preferred. 
In copyright, critiques of how existing legal rules harm the public, although forcefully 
articulated, have produced no comparable impact on policy. The question is, why not? 
Comparing the attributes of the two movements may suggest fruitful directions for further 
advocacy. This section will sketch out four families of possible explanations, one focused on the 
nature of the scholarly critique of copyright law and the others focused, in turn, on the branches 
of the federal government, each of which occupies a different role in the formulation of 
copyright policy. Within each family, one may identify points of both commonality and contrast 
with the revolution in antitrust law that bear closer examination.317 
A. Explanations Focusing on the Nature of Copyright Scholarship 
The critical body of antitrust scholarship that emerged in the 1960s began almost 
immediately to influence the decisions of the courts in ways that continued to develop for several 
decades.318 Perhaps the reason why the body of critical contemporary copyright scholarship has 
so far yielded no comparable results has to do with differing characteristics of the latter body of 
literature. That is, perhaps copyright scholarship differs from antitrust scholarship in ways that 
tend to diminish its relative impact on policy. 
1. Locating the Consensus of Scholarly Opinion 
One possibility that should be confronted, in the interest of intellectual honesty, is that my 
own perception of a critical consensus of disinterested expert opinion is actually in error. My 
own review of the scholarship on copyright law leads me to the conclusion that a rough but 
substantial consensus has formed around the desirability of protecting and expanding the public 
domain, a policy prescription that stands sharply at variance from the recent restrictive trend of 
copyright legislation and court decisions.319 If the center of gravity in copyright discourse 
                                                                    
317 My position as a legal scholar rather than a political scientist or public policy researcher leads me to ground 
the inquiry that follows predominantly in legal terms, rather than primarily in terms of institutional prerogatives or 
interest-group dynamics. Where the topic under scrutiny concerns the formulation and implementation of policy in 
the real world, however, it may be impossible as a practical matter to avoid brushing up against domains that may be 
more developed outside legal discourse than within it. It is highly likely that the development of more robust 
answers to the questions raised in this section of the essay will depend critically upon the use of insights from 
academic domains different from my own. 
For an example of recent work attempting to apply methodologies from other domains to the analysis of legal 
questions, see Daniel Martin Katz, Michael James Bommarito II, & Josh Blackman, Predicting the Behavior of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: A General Approach, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463244 (July 21, 
2014). 
318 See generally supra notes 16–60 and accompanying text. 
319 See supra notes 75–106 and accompanying text. 
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actually rests elsewhere, in a position more hospitable to the ever-greater restrictions on the 
public domain that have been a hallmark of United States policy for decades, then it would be 
quite unsurprising for Congress and the courts to proceed as they in fact have. Although I have 
sought to avoid doing so, perhaps I have self-selected a subset of the extant copyright scholarship 
that happens to appeal to me and misidentified where the scholarly consensus actually rests.320 
To the argument that my misapprehension of the location of the scholarly consensus 
explains the perceived resistance of Congress and the courts to that consensus, two responses 
might be made, neither of which requires acceptance of my perception of a disinterested expert 
consensus.321 
First, the example of the Chicago School’s influence on antitrust law counters any notion 
that critical ideas must become part of the conventional wisdom before they exert influence on 
policy. Law-and-economics scholarship began to influence the courts in antitrust cases almost 
immediately, even if its full impact was not felt until some decades had elapsed.322 Even as the 
law-and-economics movement was transforming antitrust law, however, its own core premises 
were the subject of vigorous and ongoing debate.323 Competing strands of scholarly opinion in 
antitrust continued waging rear-guard actions long after the Chicago School methodology had 
taken root in the case law.324 The point, again, is not to argue over whether the courts should 
have reoriented antitrust doctrine along the lines suggested by Chicago School economic theory 
                                                                    
320 Cf. Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 317–20 
(2009) (cautioning scholars on both sides of the intellectual property debate to avoid dividing themselves into 
insular and competing camps). 
321 Of course, I don’t believe I am incorrect in perceiving a broadly shared scholarly consensus that that 
copyright law as presently constituted systematically undervalues the public domain and thereby disserves the public 
interest. If I am truly wrong about what most scholars believe, I can say only that many others suffer from the same 
confusion. See, e.g., supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
322 See supra notes 16–60 and accompanying text. 
323 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1987) 
(summarizing and rebutting several challenges to the movement both inside and outside the legal academy in the 
1970s); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. Rev. 1, 2–8 (1986) (identifying limits on value of 
economic analysis in addressing complex social problems); Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem 
of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929 (suggesting that novelty of applying economic jargon in legal analysis 
challenged the ability of lawyers and judges to understand and articulate the law); cf. Richard A. Posner, The 
Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 767–69 (1987) (arguing that 
insights from economics, philosophy, political science and other domains ultimately strengthen legal discourse). 
324 See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. 
REV. 219 (1995); Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1805, 1830–34 (1990) (criticizing executive enforcement actions and court decisions predicated upon Chicago 
School economic analysis); Robert H. Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) 
Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 631 (1989); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—
Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 NYU L. REV. 936, 956–60 
(1987). 
55
Armstrong: Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2016
 
as they in fact did. The point, rather, is simply to point out that that reorientation happened 
before, not after, Chicago-style law-and-economic analysis attained anything approaching the 
breadth of expert consensus that now prevails among copyright scholars on the law’s 
underprotection of the public domain. Thus, even if I have incorrectly characterized the actual 
consensus of disinterested expert opinion in copyright law, the transformation of antitrust law 
based upon research that was not yet the subject of a similar consensus suggests that the 
existence of consensus is not dispositive. 
Second, regardless of whether reform-oriented copyright scholars actually represent a 
numerical majority of disinterested experts, as I believe, those scholars’ arguments have been 
painstakingly explained and developed in a voluminous and still-expanding body of professional 
literature and deserve a fair hearing in any forum that aspires to intellectual rigor. The quality of 
the arguments for protecting the public domain matters even more than their quantity. If the 
scholars whose views were briefly surveyed above are correct, then existing copyright law 
systematically under-protects the public domain, thereby both harming consumers and 
dampening technological innovation. The ideal of reasoned deliberation demands that an honest 
decision-maker explain why those scholars are actually incorrect before enacting or upholding 
further restrictions on the public domain. Intelligent rejoinders to the voluminous body of 
contrary scholarship, however, are precisely what is missing from court decisions such as Eldred, 
Kahle, and Golan. The cases’ failure even to recognize, much less to rebut, the insights 
developed in the modern corpus of copyright scholarship on the public domain is itself a 
problem, irrespective of whether that corpus actually reflects (as I believe it does) the consensus 
of disinterested expert opinion. 
2. Scholarship and Decision-making 
A second response might explain the apparent lack of influence exerted by critical 
copyright scholarship by asking whether scholars’ views actually matter to real-world decision-
makers such as legislative bodies and courts. Chicago-School antitrust reformers of the 1960s 
and 1970s, the argument might run, wrote articles intended to be immediately useful to 
enforcement agencies and courts. Since that time, critics might continue, legal scholarship has 
become pedantic and abstruse, concerned less with practical application than with debating how 
many angels may dance on the head of a pin. This change in the nature of legal scholarship, a 
skeptical advocate might conclude, explains why antitrust scholarship succeeded in moving the 
courts where copyright scholarship has not. 
Some judges, to be sure, have questioned the practical relevance of legal scholarship to 
real-world disputes. More than two decades have passed since Judge Harry Edwards said that 
courts had little use for the work of legal scholars,325 and others have taken up the refrain since 
                                                                    
325 See Edwards, supra note 4. The intervening years have not softened Judge Edwards’ views. See Harry T. 
Edwards, Another Look at Professor Rodell’s Goodbye to Law Reviews, 100 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2014). 
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that time.326 By this point, perhaps the complaint that legal scholarship is irrelevant to legal 
practice has been repeated often enough to become a self-fulfilling prophecy: courts have been 
told so often that legal scholarship is whimsical, absurd, and divorced from reality that they may 
no longer even bother to investigate whether anything in the scholarly literature may be of 
assistance in deciding a pending case. On the other hand, some measures suggest that judicial 
citations to legal scholarship are increasing, or at least not declining, inviting the inference that 
                                                                    
326 To take a widely reported example, Chief Justice John Roberts responded to a question about the 
disconnect between the legal academy and the judiciary by criticizing legal scholarship (while simultaneously 
admitting that he does not actually read it): 
Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is likely to be, you 
know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in eighteenth-century 
Bulgaria, or something, which I am sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote 
it, but isn’t of much help to the bar . . . . [I]f the academy is interested in having an 
influence on the practice of law and the development of law, that they would be wise to 
sort of stop and think, is this area of research going to be of help to anyone other than 
other academics. You know, it’s their business, but people ask me, what the last law 
review article I read was, and I have to think very hard before I come up with one. 
Annual Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Conference, C-SPAN, at http://www.c-span.org/Events/AnnualFourth-
Circuit-Court-of-Appeals-Conference/10737422476-1/, at 28:50 (June 25, 2011). Some scholars disputed the 
characterization. See, e.g., Danielle Citron, Sherrilyn Ifill on What the Chief Justice Should Read on Summer 
Vacation, CONCURRING OPINIONS, at http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/07/sherrilyn-ifill-on-what-the-
chief-justice-should-read-on-summer-vacation.html (July 1, 2011). Others have acknowledged at least some of the 
force of the criticism and offered proposals aimed at rectifying the perceived disconnect between the bench and the 
academy. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Keith Hirokawa, & Sean Nolon, Towards Engaged Scholarship, 33 PACE L. REV. 
821 (2013); Ross E. Davies, In Search of Helpful Legal Scholarship, Part 2: Shall We Dance, 2 J.L. 255 (2012). A 
puckish rejoinder to the Chief Justice is available in Orin S. Kerr, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary 
Approaches in 18th-Century Bulgaria, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2015). 
The Final Report of the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, issued in January 
2014 but not yet adopted by the full ABA as of the date of this writing, also called for at least some law schools to 
deemphasize the production of scholarship, citing the benefits of greater heterogeneity among institutions and the 
need for greater cost-benefit scrutiny of faculty scholarly activity. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION 34 (Jan. 2014), at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_recommendatio
ns_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf. Others, however, have challenged the notion that a de-emphasis on faculty 
scholarship will improve either educational outcomes or our system of justice: 
We all are bombarded with data; consumed with information; and too often lack the time 
needed for reflection; the time needed to cultivate wisdom. The vision of a scholar in her 
garret has not lost its appeal. Nor has it lost its value. It is that scholar who has the time 
and freedom to reflect deeply on the law and wonder about the connection or connections 
between law and justice or about the nature and elements of a good society. In a word, we 
can call these reflections scholarship and they are the essential elements of a sound 
structure of legal education as distinct from legal training. 
Joseph P. Tomain, ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, Working Paper (August 1, 2013), available at 
http://perma.cc/J6J5-YU3U. 
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some judges find this scholarship useful.327 Nevertheless, perhaps legal scholarship in general 
(and copyright scholarship in particular) simply holds less value today to decision-makers 
attempting to resolve real-world disputes. 
This explanation, too, has some problems. If Judge Edwards’s critique was ever valid as a 
general matter, it is certainly impossible to sustain as a description of contemporary copyright 
scholarship. Only someone ignorant of the current copyright literature could believe it to be a 
domain of airy, highfalutin theorizing. To the contrary, as Professor Ann Bartow has written: 
The problem is not a lack of useful academic writings on the subjects 
within the purview of the Copyright Act. There are many brilliant law 
review articles that make a host of sensible normative recommendations, 
and many legal scholars have written trenchant critiques describing 
misinterpretations or misapplications of copyright law. But the practical 
effect of most of this work has generally been quite modest.328 
The academic critique of how the courts and Congress have jointly restricted the public domain 
demonstrates that existing doctrine does real harm to real persons. Current law reduces the 
overall level of creative and innovative activity and impedes the dissemination of knowledge. 
This is what is actually happening in the world right now, today; and it will keep happening until 
the law improves. Scholars’ concerns are far from unduly abstract or theoretical; to the contrary, 
they lie at the core of copyright law’s constitutional purpose. 
Moreover, even if a general belief in the irrelevance of legal scholarship leads courts not 
to seek out pertinent sources in a particular case, competent attorneys have every incentive to 
                                                                    
327 Professors Lee Petherbridge and David Schwartz have explored this question from a variety of angles. See 
Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 
106 NW. U.L. REV. 995, 1007–09 (2012); David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by 
the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1359–64 (2011). See also Wisdom, 
supra note 4. 
328 Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. 
REV. 457, 464 (2014); see also id. at 464–66 (responding to Chief Justice Roberts’ criticism of legal scholarship and 
concluding that it “is especially true with copyright law” that “really good law review articles on important topics 
can be completely overlooked”). 
Professors Petherbridge and Schwartz recently found that during the last half century, the Supreme Court actually 
cited legal scholarship more frequently in copyright cases than in most other types of cases; a fact that is not easily 
squared with the contention that copyright scholarship has no value to courts. See Lee Petherbridge & David L. 
Schwartz, The End of an Epithet? An Exploration of the Use of Legal Scholarship in Intellectual Property Decisions, 
50 HOUS. L. REV. 523, 540, 542 (2012); see also id. at 556–57 (hypothesizing possible explanations for the 
imbalance in the Court’s citation patterns of copyright and trademark law scholarship). Although Professor Bartow’s 
work, quoted above, again identifies the courts’ overreliance on the Nimmer on Copyright treatise as an area of 
particular concern, this factor cannot explain the imbalance found in Professors Petherbridge and Schwartz’s study, 
because their data set excluded citations to legal treatises. See id. at 539; see also Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the 
Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581 (2004). 
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incorporate the insights from scholarship into their own arguments to the court, making it 
unlikely that those sources will remain forever unknown to the courts.329 The argument that 
scholarship has little worth and will be ignored by decision-makers, accordingly, seems to me to 
miss the mark in the copyright context. 
3. Measuring the Impact of Copyright Law 
A third possibility might be that the available academic copyright literature is 
insufficiently robust to serve as a reliable basis to guide or alter policy-making. Economics (and 
also “law-and-economics”) scholarship, such as the scholarship that guided the courts’ 
transformation of antitrust law, is filled with formulas and graphs that convey the appearance 
(and perhaps the reality) of analytical rigor. Economic scholarship served to quantify the trade-
offs involved in competing legal regimes: tighter environmental laws, for instance, may confer 
social benefits by reducing exposure to toxins, but simultaneously exact social costs in the form 
of higher prices for the goods polluters produce. Developing the “optimal” environmental 
regime, economic analysis posits, entails quantifying and weighing the benefits versus the 
associated costs to determine which approach yields the greatest aggregate social utility.330 
Perhaps the problem is that the extant copyright reform scholarship has not, as yet, reached the 
same level of analytical strength as the scholarship upon which the courts based their 
transformation of antitrust law. This possibility, to my mind at least, carries a little more force 
than the previous two; although it surely is not the whole story. 
Copyright law is often said to rest upon a sort of psychological inference about what 
motivates creators to create: Authors whose works are unprotected against copying by others 
may decline to create those works in the first place, depriving society of the benefit of their 
creations. Conferring such protection via copyright, in contrast, provides an incentive that may 
motivate the creation of at least some expressive works that would otherwise never have been 
produced.331 Because providing such incentives will yield collective benefits by increasing the 
                                                                    
329 See, e.g., Jared Klaus, Law Reviews: An Undervalued Resource, OHIO LAW., May/June 2012, at 28. 
330 A classic version of this analysis is available in WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR 
OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974). 
331 See, e.g., Richard Watt, The Basic Economic Theory of Copyright, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 9, 13 (Richard Watt, ed., 2014). My summary is not intended 
as an endorsement of the incentives rationale, which (as discussed below) has been questioned by more recent 
scholarship. Further complicating matters, the incentives rationale has frequently been joined in U.S. history with a 
second argument that characterizes creation as a morally praiseworthy activity deserving of reward for that reason 
alone. See, e.g., Stewart E. Stark, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996). This 
second argument is not easily squared with the Supreme Court’s clear disapproval of the so-called “sweat of the 
brow” doctrine in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352–54 (1996) (declaring 
the investment of labor involved in the creation of a work to be irrelevant to the quantum of copyright protection 
that work receives). See also Stark, supra, at 1220–22 (arguing that Feist calls even the “incentives” theory of 
copyright into doubt). 
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production of expressive works, the argument runs, providing such incentives makes sense in the 
aggregate even if copyright protection increases the cost to a consumer of obtaining a work. 
As a basis for a far-reaching legal regime with global effects on trade and cultural 
development, this basic syllogism—if copyright, then more expressive works—fairly cries out for 
supporting empirical detail.332 Which creators must receive incentives in order to induce them to 
create?333 Which types of works will actually be under-produced if no incentives are supplied?334 
Should we withhold incentives from works that we conclude would still be produced without 
them?335 If incentives are necessary, should they take the form of a statutory monopoly as 
copyright does, or are there less costly ways to stimulate the same level of creative output?336 
How long must the incentives endure to secure the intended benefit?337 Do the strength and 
duration of necessary incentives vary among different types of expressive works?338 And finally, 
                                                                    
332 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, ©OPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL ERA: 
BUILDING EVIDENCE FOR POLICY 1 (2013) (noting that the “strident debate over copyright’s proper scope and terms 
and means of its enforcement” “is poorly informed by independent empirical research”), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/14686/copyright-in-the-digital-era-building-evidence-for-policy. 
333 Motion pictures, to take only one obvious example, result from the coordinated endeavors of the dozens or 
even hundreds of creators whose names appear in the credits. Yet films have only a single “author”; all the other 
contributors listed in the credits are legal strangers to the copyright. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 
1232–36 (9th Cir. 2000); Lindsay v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1612–14 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
334 See, e.g., Stark, supra note 331, at 1213–15. 
335 See, e.g., Matthew P. Larvick, Questioning the Necessity of Copyright Protection for Software Interfaces, 
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 187; Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 344 (1970) (noting apparent irrelevance of copyright 
protection to producers of early generations of computer software). 
336 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT ch. 6 (2004) (outlining alternative system to compensate producers of recorded entertainment, 
modeled on the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, whereby funds collected from a levy on the sale of copying 
tools and blank media would be distributed to creators of recorded entertainment proportionate to the measured 
popularity of their works online); Breyer, supra note 335, at 305–08 (using purchasers’ cooperatives and government 
subsidies to illustrate alternative financing systems for the production of some presently copyrighted works). 
337 The principle that the public interest demands strict boundaries on the duration of copyright, although 
ignored by the Congress that enacted the CTEA, is deeply rooted. This passage from Baron Macaulay’s speech in 
the House of Commons on February 5, 1841 states the issue forthrightly: 
It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of 
remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. For the sake of the good 
we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary 
for the purpose of securing the good. 
The speech is reprinted in 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1476 (1994) (emphasis added).  
338 See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative 
Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1 (2008); Michael J. Madison, Comment: Where Does 
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given that every unit of social resources allocated to provide incentives to creators leaves one 
less unit available to pursue other goals,339 and that providing incentives may have both positive 
and negative effects on expressive output,340 what is the optimal level of creative production that 
the law should aim to achieve?341 None of these questions is purely quantitative; each is tightly 
interwoven with difficult issues of individual preference and social values.342 Yet each question 
might be illuminated, at least partially, by types of data that remain largely unavailable to 
contemporary decision-makers.343 
The principle that copyright rules should be based upon facts and evidence about the real-
world effects of competing policy choices, rather than psychological suppositions and romantic 
                                                                    
Creativity Come From? and Other Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 761 (2003) (“Different types 
or classes of authors may work in systematically different ways, suggesting that copyright’s contours should vary, 
rather than remaining uniform across time and across all works.”). 
339 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
483, 655 (1996) (“justifying copyright requires some determination that society will benefit more from devoting 
additional resources to creating works of authorship than from the alternative investments to which the resources 
would otherwise have been devoted”). 
340 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
341 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and ‘Market Power’ in the Marketplace of Ideas, in 
ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 149, 167–68 (Howard Shelanski & François 
Lévêque, eds., 2005). 
342Professor Netanel, for example, has described the consequences of copyright restrictions for democratic civil 
society and articulated an alternative vision that takes seriously the Supreme Court’s description of copyright as the 
“engine of free expression.” See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 347–64 (1996); see also Netanel, supra note 341, at 169–71; supra note 92 and accompanying text. Professor 
Netanel’s is a far more attractive vision, it seems to me, than the Supreme Court’s stated view that the public’s 
interest lies solely in preserving the ability to purchase expressive works in the market. See supra note 286 and 
accompanying text. 
343 As Professor Madison put it: 
We need research and analysis that explores not only, “Do we need the incentive of 
intellectual property law or of copyright in particular?,” but in what ways and by what 
methods do creators (individuals, firms, other institutions) draw on different resources in 
the creative process, and what does that tell us about how the relevant legal regime 
should be structured? We have workable supply-side models of law and creativity. The 
law declares that it provides incentives of different sorts to create. We need demand-side 
models, and empirical investigation of their robustness. What kinds of inputs do different 
kinds of creators need or use? How are works created? 
Madison, supra note 338, at 762 (footnotes omitted). 
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moralizing about authorship, arose relatively recently344 and remains controversial.345 
Nevertheless, new strands of evidence-based research have begun to appear in the copyright 
literature.346 
For the moment, however, academic research seeking to quantify the likely costs and 
benefits of policy change in the copyright arena must subsist with a relative paucity of reliable 
economic data. The development of reliable and impartial information to guide policy going 
forward is itself apt to prove controversial. Existing copyright law supports highly concentrated, 
profitable, and politically influential industries347 who derive direct economic benefits from 
tightening intellectual property protections. Those industries’ propensity to over-hype perceived 
competitive threats has been recognized elsewhere.348 Due to the possibility of bias stemming 
from institutional self-interest, it is only appropriate to treat industry predictions about the value 
of the creative industries to the global economy or alleged losses from copyright infringement 
with some skepticism.349 Lacking unbiased alternative sources of data, however, scholars may 
have little choice but to rely, at least in part, on self-reported industry statistics. 
Separate difficulties attend any attempt rigorously to measure the costs, as opposed to the 
benefits, of copyright protection. The public’s interest in preserving the public domain, although 
real, may prove resistant to quantification. At present, efforts to measure the economic value of 
                                                                    
344 See BLAYNE HAGGART, COPYFIGHT: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT REFORM vii (2014) 
(“it’s a three-hundred-year-old policy and only now we’re starting to ask for evidence? That’s the copyright debate 
in a nutshell.”). 
345 See WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT ch. 2 (2011) (ridiculing current copyright policy as “faith-
based” and calling for a stronger empirical support); see also, e.g., Ivan P.L. Png, Copyright: A Plea for Empirical 
Research, 3(2) REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3 (2006) (identifying several areas where further data need 
to be developed). 
346 See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (2015); Symposium: Steps Toward Evidence-Based IP, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1757 (2014); Peter DiCola, 
Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 301 (2013); Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of 
Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669 (2006). Cf. Samuelson et al., supra note 110, at 1205–06 (proposing 
new empirical policy research capabilities and staff for the U.S. Copyright Office). 
347 See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 119–20 (2009) (noting very small 
number of “players” in recorded entertainment industry); HAGGART, supra note 344, at 102–03 (noting profitability 
of content industries and the advantages in access and messaging that their size confers); Jessica D. Litman, 
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) (tracing influence of affected 
industries on drafting of legislation that became the Copyright Act of 1976). 
348 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
125 (2011); Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions, 
13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 92–93 (1994); American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2517–18 
(2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
349 See, e.g., I.P.L. Png, On the Reliability of Software Piracy Statistics, 9 ELEC. COMM. RESEARCH & 
APPLICATIONS 365 (2010). 
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copyright’s exceptions, such as the fair use doctrine,350 may represent the best proxy for 
estimating the public’s stake in copyright policy; yet those efforts remain in their infancy and 
their limitations remain readily apparent. 
Finally, there is clearly a limit to how far data can take copyright policy. Copyright 
protection that is either too strong or too weak may prevent some expressive works from coming 
into existence at all.351 Assigning an economic value to a nonexistent work would be a 
speculative exercise, akin to measuring the height of a building that was never constructed. 
Furthermore, personal, noncommercial uses of copyrighted works may be culturally very 
important but are also exceedingly difficult to measure.352 The law’s effects on such 
noncommercial uses, while potentially substantial, may also tend to escape consideration in any 
quantitative analysis. 
B. Explanations Focusing on Congress 
To explain the failure of reformist copyright scholarship to exert a similar level of 
influence on policy as Chicago School writings did on antitrust law, one should also consider the 
role of Congress. Despite the large role Congress contemplated for the courts in developing 
substantive copyright law, copyright is governed directly by statutory language to a much greater 
extent than antitrust law.353 Thus, it is worth spending a little time examining the possibility that 
reformist copyright scholarship has exerted limited influence thus far because of its failure to 
prompt the enactment of new legislative protections for the public domain. 
Because copyright law is based on the language of a lengthy and complex statute, 
perhaps the best hope for copyright reform lies in persuading Congress that greater protections 
for the public domain are required. Indeed, with the volume of legislative activity rising in the 
last two years (particularly on the House side, where multiple hearings on copyright revision 
have been held),354 legislative interest in and attention to copyright issues has reached a height 
                                                                    
350 See, e.g., COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASS’N, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: ECONOMIC 
CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE (2011), at http://www.ccianet.org/wp-
content/uploads/library/CCIA-FairUseintheUSEconomy-2011.pdf. 
351 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
352 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2006) (noting difficulties of 
identifying clearly lawful uses under United States law). 
353 Cf. supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text. All the controversies sketched out in the preceding section of 
this article arose in response to the passage of legislation amending the Copyright Act in ways that tended to restrict 
the public domain. See supra Part IV.A. 
354 The Register of Copyrights’ recent call for statutory revision has kicked off a cycle of subcommittee 
hearings in the House of Representatives aimed ultimately at crafting new legislation to replace the 1976 Act. See 
Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013); Future of Music Coalition, 
House Copyright Review Timeline, at https://www.futureofmusic.org/article/article/house-copyright-review-timeline 
(July 20, 2014). 
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not seen in decades. Congress is listening. It is worth inquiring, therefore, whether reformist 
arguments are being advanced in ways that will ultimately foster legislative protections for the 
public domain. 
Although many would-be copyright reformers write for a generalist audience,355 most of 
the previously referenced literature on copyright and the public domain consists of law review 
articles.356 Those articles are, in form at least, broadly typical of legal academic writing as a 
genre: they are lengthy, densely reasoned, heavily footnoted, and stylistically dry. While other 
scholars value the thoroughness and intellectual rigor of their peers’ work, those same qualities 
may diminish the usefulness of a scholar’s work for nonspecialist audiences. A busy legislator 
(or even a busy staffer) dealing simultaneously with proposals spanning the vast range of 
subjects addressed by the United States government may have essentially no capacity to absorb 
an argument, no matter how persuasive, articulated in a fifty-page law journal article.357 To the 
extent that reformers seek legislative action, other forms of advocacy may serve their arguments 
better than the continued expansion of the academic literature on the public domain. 
Furthermore, efforts to achieve copyright reform through legislation necessarily bring the 
interests of powerful, self-interested actors to the fore. As Justice Breyer observed in Golan, 
Congress pays disproportionate attention to the interests of copyright industry incumbents who 
believe themselves to be threatened by any change in the status quo.358 This problem is hardly 
unique to copyright, of course; defenders of existing policy often enjoy strategic advantages in 
                                                                    
355 In this category I would include many of the copyright-related writings of authors such as Lawrence Lessig, 
Richard Stallman, Siva Vaidhyanathan, Clay Shirky, and Cory Doctorow, to name just a few. Pamela Samuelson 
writes for both legal scholars and the technology community. William Patry presents a rare example of someone 
with feet firmly planted on both the “mass audience” and “academic specialist” sides of the divide; he is 
simultaneously the author of multiple short books advocating for copyright reform as well as the multi-volume Patry 
on Copyright treatise. 
356 See generally supra notes 75–106 and accompanying text. 
357 Cf. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE ch. 4 (2009) (noting difficulties 
presented in considering any individual policy proposal stemming from issue complexity and the lack of time or 
attention available from legislators and staff). 
358 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 907 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress, with one minor exception, 
heard testimony only from the representatives of existing copyright holders, who hoped that passage of the statute 
would enable them to benefit from reciprocal treatment of American authors abroad”); see also id. at 910 (noting 
that arguments presented to Congress in support of the URAA “ directly concern[ed] a private benefit: how to obtain 
more money from the sales of existing products” rather than “a public benefit, such as how to promote or to protect 
the creative process.”). Perhaps Professor Lessig is correct that the linchpin issue here is the financing of elections; 
perhaps it is the case that freeing legislators from a virtually all-consuming preoccupation with financing their own 
campaigns (and the resulting solicitude that they exhibit towards the interests of prospective donors) is the 
indispensable first step towards refocusing legislative activity on the interests of the broader public. See generally 
LESSIG, supra note 6. At present, members of Congress must devote an inordinate portion of their time to 
fundraising; solving the election funding problem might also increase the amount of time legislators could spend 
developing substantive policy expertise. See supra note 357 and accompanying text. 
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resisting change.359 But the massive size and concentrated structure of the industries who benefit 
from existing copyright law, and the extremely diffuse and amorphous interests of the public who 
pay copyright’s costs, make the contrast especially stark and further reduce the likelihood of 
remedial legislative action.360 
But there is yet another complicating factor for advocates of expanded protections for the 
public domain. A necessary precondition to meaningful legislative reform is a much broader 
agreement on a family of basic principles that may then lead to the drafting of compatible 
statutory text.361 There has been little need for legislators to pay attention to the status of the 
public domain because for most of copyright’s history, the public domain was not as threatened 
as it is today.362 The resulting attitudinal shift among copyright scholars has effectively moved 
the public domain from a peripheral to a core concern of the law. Replicating that same 
attitudinal shift among copyright policy-makers will likely be the thorniest obstacle to 
meaningful legislative revision.363 
                                                                    
359 See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 357, at 81–88. 
360 See id. ch. 1 (noting that organizations speaking on behalf of ordinary citizens, despite their numbers, suffer 
from pervasive resource disadvantages compared with organizations speaking for industry needs); see also supra 
note 347 and accompanying text; but cf. supra note 350 and accompanying text (noting recent efforts to quantify 
economic benefits of copyright limitations); PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS 292–93 (2014) (noting that 
rising economic importance of technology industry may be beginning to offset content industries’ historical 
advantages in setting copyright policy). 
As Baldwin’s book illustrates, it is increasingly common in contemporary copyright discourse to assume that the 
interests of technology companies, broadly speaking, represent an adequate proxy for the interests of the public at 
large. The public’s interest in accessing and using expressive works frequently depends upon the availability of 
suitable technologies to accomplish that purpose, and technology makers often have a parallel interest in supplying 
the demand for such tools. For that reason, among others, technology suppliers often find themselves opposing 
assertions of strong proprietary claims by copyright holders. See, e.g., American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Of course, the analogy can be pressed too far; where the 
issue is privacy rather than copyright, for example, no one would assume that the interests of ordinary consumers 
align with those of technology providers. 
361 See, e.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 110. 
362 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
363 Cf. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 357, ch. 2 (noting that existing policy exerts a form of “friction” that 
slows policy change until a significant consensus for a new policy emerges). 
Another way to import contemporary copyright thinking into Congress would be for copyright scholars to run 
successfully for public office. There are those of us who would have enjoyed seeing Professor Lessig serve in the 
House (or even, perhaps, as President), although the question of his electability must wait to be decided another day. 
See Lawrence Lessig, On suspending my campaign, Nov. 3, 2015, at 
http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/132425036707/on-suspending-my-campaign; Julian Sanchez, Netroots seek to send 
legal scholar Lessig to Congress, ARS TECHNICA, Feb. 17, 2008, at http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2008/02/netroots-seek-to-send-legal-scholar-lessig-to-congress/; Mike Nizza, Lessig Decides Against Run for 
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On the other hand, the revolution in antitrust law tends to undermine the thesis that 
lasting policy change depends on legislative action. Congress had essentially no role in the 
changes in antitrust law that were sketched out above. Although some members of Congress 
(such as Ohio’s Senator Howard Metzenbaum) spoke frequently in opposition to what they 
perceived as antitrust law’s growing hospitality toward big business,364 Congressional action 
during this period was largely limited to passing occasional nonbinding resolutions expressing 
disapproval.365 The example of antitrust law demonstrates that, even in an area of federal law 
ultimately governed by statute, lasting policy change can occur despite legislative inactivity. 
Thus, although there may be a great many things that advocates of stronger protections for the 
public domain might do to persuade Congress to legislate consistently with their views, it 
remains an open question whether such action is the best use of reform advocates’ time. The 
lesson for would-be copyright reformers from the history of antitrust law is that the obstacles to 
legislative revision sketched out above need not doom the broader project to strengthen legal 
protections for the public domain, although they may require reform advocates to focus their 
attentions outside Congress. 
C. Explanations Focusing on the Executive 
Given the obstacles to meaningful legislative revision of copyright law and Congress’s 
lengthy history of enacting ever greater restrictions upon, rather than protections for, the public 
domain, copyright reform advocates might choose to focus greater attention on executive-branch 
policymakers. There is unquestionably a rising interest in copyright policy in executive agencies 
at present, with the Department of Commerce engaged in a lengthy inquiry into how the present 
structure of the law serves the nation’s economic interests.366 The question is whether any of this 
attention may be directed toward improving protections for the public domain. 
                                                                    
Congress at Internet Speed, N.Y. TIMES NEWS BLOG, Feb. 25, 2008, at 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/25/lessig-decides-against-run-for-congress-at-internet-speed/. In general, 
however, whether inside or outside the realm of intellectual property, there are not many examples of legal scholars 
directly lobbying Congress (much less seeking elective office themselves) in an effort to have their positions enacted 
into law.  
364 See, e.g., Howard Metzenbaum, Report from the United States Senate, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (1981); 
Howard M. Metzenbaum, Is William Baxter Anti-Antitrust?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1981, archived at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/18/business/is-william-baxter-anti-antitrust.html. 
365 See, e.g., H. Res. No. 303, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 35,184–86 (1985) (disapproving of the 
DOJ Antitrust Division’s Vertical Restraints Guidelines as, inter alia, inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Dr. Miles, discussed supra notes 21, 52 and accompanying text). Cf. also Alan A. Fisher et al., Do the DOJ 
Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 639–40 (1987) (discussing the same 
House Resolution as well as political opposition from state attorneys general); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 324, at 
951–52 (describing legislative resolution aimed at forbidding DOJ from spending money to articulate certain 
economic views in amicus curiae briefs). 
366 See INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND 
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2013) (more commonly known as the “Green Paper”), available at 
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1. Reformist Attitudes Among Executive Officials 
The first obstacle to relying on executive action to strengthen the public domain stems 
from the attitudes of the executive-branch officials with influence over copyright policy. 
Advocates for copyright reform lack visible representation in the pertinent executive agencies. 
This situation contrasts markedly with the revolution in antitrust law, which was driven to a 
substantial degree by changes in enforcement activity at the federal level. Proponents of Chicago 
School microeconomic analysis were appointed to positions of decision-making authority in the 
agencies charged with antitrust enforcement, whose subsequent enforcement activity reflected 
Chicago School principles and priorities.367 To date, would-be copyright reformers have attained 
no comparable positions of influence in any recent Administration.368 Perhaps the key to 
replicating the transformation of antitrust law in the realm of copyright is to build awareness 
among Executive officers and agency staff of the importance of strengthening protections for the 
public domain, and to appoint similarly minded individuals to positions of policy influence. 
Nevertheless, antitrust offers an imperfect parallel. Executive decisions about 
enforcement play a less prominent role in the making of copyright policy than in antitrust law. 
Copyright is a form of property right held by an individual author or publisher, and violations of 
that right ordinarily are vindicated through a private lawsuit against the accused infringer.369 
Because antitrust law is a regulatory regime that takes as its goal the efficient operation of 
markets as a whole, it invites a more significant role for government. The government brings 
                                                                    
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf. An overview of the Green 
Paper’s research and recommendations is available in Shira Perlmutter, Making Copyright Work for a Global 
Market: Policy Revision on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49 (2014). 
367 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003); Marc Allen Eisner & Kenneth J. Meier, Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic 
Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 269, 273–74 (1990). For a defense of this 
reorientation of Executive-branch enforcement decisions by one of its architects, see William F. Baxter, Separation 
of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661 (1981). 
368 To consider only one high-profile example: activist Carl Malamud, the founder of the public.resource.org 
Web site and one of the lead organizers of the “law.gov” movement, has likely done more than any other single 
individual to provide free public access to primary legal source materials. For discussions of Malamud’s work, see, 
e.g., Beth Ford, Comment, Open Wide the Gates of Legal Access, 93 OR. L. REV. 539, 553–64 (2014). Early in the 
Obama Administration, Malamud began waging a (in retrospect, quixotic) campaign to be appointed Public Printer 
of the United States, promising to make public domain federal legal information more accessible online. See Carl 
Malamud, Prepared Statement, archived at https://yeswescan.org/index.gpo.html (Mar. 15, 2009). The Obama 
Administration’s decision to overlook public domain advocates such as Malamud may explain why privately 
organized digitization initiatives have so far outpaced the Government Publications Office at producing high-quality 
digital archives of public records. See, e.g., Supreme Court of the United States, Bound Volumes, at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes.aspx (providing scanned copies of slightly over ten percent of 
the United States Reports, the other ninety percent of which are widely available elsewhere online but have never 
been provided by the Government). 
369 See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012). 
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more antitrust cases than copyright cases.370 And while there have been pressures for the 
Administration to take more aggressive enforcement measures against mass infringement,371 no 
Executive-branch agency enjoys as high a profile in the making and enforcement of copyright 
law as both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission occupy in antitrust. 
Even if a new Administration were to commit itself to strengthening legal protections for the 
public domain through the appointment of sympathetic personnel to positions of policy 
influence, it is far from clear which offices should be targeted. 
2. Copyright’s Other Executive Constituencies 
There is another problem with relying on Executive officials to lead the effort to improve 
protections for the public domain that is less easily addressed. The problem here is that the 
existing structure of copyright law serves other governmental interests beyond merely promoting 
the creation and dissemination of expressive works. Copyright has other Executive 
constituencies who may be expected to respond skeptically to any effort to increase protections 
for the public domain. Addressing the effects of copyright revision on policy objectives that are 
themselves unconnected with copyright’s core purposes may prove to be the most difficult 
obstacle to reformist arguments. 
A comparison with the history of antitrust revision may illustrate the point. Antitrust 
reform was touted as a response to substantive complaints that excessive enforcement was 
harming the international competitiveness of key domestic industries (principally by inhibiting 
the types of economies of scale that were necessary to compete with vertically integrated foreign 
firms).372 Opinions varied as to whether these concerns were valid or supported the significant 
                                                                    
370 For the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, the United States brought 14 of the 799 civil antitrust cases 
filed in the federal courts, or just under 2% of the total. This seemingly small number nevertheless represents a far 
greater ratio than in copyright litigation: of the 4,041 new civil copyright cases filed during the same period, none 
was brought by the United States. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (2014), tbl. C-2. On the criminal side, the 
federal government initiated prosecution of 44 antitrust cases and 35 copyright cases during the same period. See id. 
tbl. D-2. The figures do not account for the role of state attorneys general, who also litigate more frequently in the 
antitrust field. 
371 See, e.g., Benton Martin & Jeremiah Newhall, Criminal Copyright Enforcement Against Filesharing 
Services, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 101 (2013) (discussing prosecution of Megaupload site by United States 
government). 
372 See, e.g., Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition 
and Antitrust, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (1990) (arguing that United States law inhibited forms of efficient inter-firm 
cooperation that foreign firms used); Malcolm Baldrige, Two Areas of Antitrust Law in Need of Reform, 1983 DET. 
C.L. REV. 1035 (arguing that antitrust law should permit more horizontal collaboration among United States 
competitors); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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alterations in antitrust policy that they actually produced,373 but the point for present purposes is 
simply that this was in fact the justification that was offered contemporaneously by government 
officials for reformulating United States antitrust law. This rationale fitted well with existing 
constituencies in the Executive Branch who sought to promote overseas market access by U.S. 
firms. Small wonder, then, that some of the most enthusiastic cheerleading for the reorientation 
of antitrust law came not from antitrust officials at the DOJ and FTC, but from the export-
promoting U.S. Department of Commerce.374 
The same constituencies who supported revision of the antitrust laws in the name of 
promoting global trade, however, may resist moves to strengthen the public domain in copyright 
law. Particularly in view of the United States’ long-term trade deficit in goods and services,375 
policy makers may view the maintenance of the nation’s large trade surplus in intellectual 
property as a significant policy imperative.376 Because any policy change that lessens the need 
for the payment of royalties to United States publishers, media companies, software companies, 
or other IP-intensive industries will have a negative impact on the nation’s balance of payments, 
such changes will invite critical scrutiny from economic policy-makers. 
It is not easy to envision how advocates of stronger protections for the public domain will 
formulate a persuasive response to the objection that reversing the historic trends towards ever-
stronger, ever-lengthier copyright protection in the United States will redound to the nation’s 
competitive disadvantage. One answer may be to argue that such international competitive 
concerns have nothing to do with the core purposes of copyright law (namely, to encourage the 
creation of new works) and are therefore irrelevant.377 Those core purposes, however, have 
carried little force in international debates over copyright, where negotiators have been 
motivated far more by perceived national interests in the costs and benefits of any given 
                                                                    
373 See, e.g., Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Horizontal Merger Policy: Promoting Competition and 
American Competitiveness, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 871 (1986); Donald I. Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest 
in an International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 16 (1974). 
374 See, e.g., Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Joint Ventures, Antitrust, and Transnational Cartelization, 11 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 433, 435–36 (1991) (quoting several Commerce Department officials); Baldrige, supra note 
372. 
375 The trade deficit stood at –$476 billion in 2013, representing a manufacturing deficit of over $700 billion 
partly offset by a $225 billion surplus in services. See generally Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, International Economic Accounts, at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm (providing data for 
download in a variety of formats). 
376 See, e.g., Lionel Bently, R. v the Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 1, 57–59 (2008) (recognizing and criticizing the tendency of U.S. copyright policy to focus on export 
promotion). Diminishing competition in the U.S. market from infringing imports serves the same policy objective, 
simply from the opposite direction, and is also a longstanding feature of U.S. law. See 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2012); 
but cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (statute’s prohibition on infringing imports does 
not reach copy of work the making of which was lawful under the law of the nation in which it was produced). 
377 This is essentially Justice Breyer’s position. See supra notes 184, 301 and accompanying text. 
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proposal. Refocusing the international debate on how best to encourage the creation and use of 
expressive works (concerns that have been influential at the national level) would be a valuable 
step,378 but one that would require trade negotiators to discard analytical constructs to which they 
have been long habituated.379 If United States policymakers remain focused on the effects of 
copyright law on national revenues, then perhaps public-domain advocates should emphasize the 
potential expansion of expressive output (and the corresponding expansion of possible licensing 
arrangements) that would occur if more robust protections for the public domain are enacted,380 
although this argument would be subject to the same evidentiary difficulties addressed above.381 
The way forward on this issue is presently unclear. Developing research to counter the concerns 
of other Executive Branch policymakers who have influence over the direction of copyright law 
may represent the most challenging imperative for advocates of greater protections for the public 
domain. 
D. Explanations Focusing on the Judiciary 
As an alternative to relying on legislative or executive action, copyright reform advocates 
might continue to focus their attentions on the judiciary. As already noted, however, the 
outpouring of scholarship on the public domain in the last two decades has yet to exert much of 
an impact on judicial decisions. The mere production of additional scholarship on the public 
domain may be a necessary, but clearly not a sufficient, step to achieving more favorable results 
in actual litigated disputes. 
In the antitrust arena, some of the scholars most strongly associated with Chicago School 
economics received high-profile judicial appointments during the Reagan Administration: Judges 
Posner and Easterbrook to the Seventh Circuit, and Judge Bork to the D.C. Circuit. At present, at 
least, advocates for copyright reform cannot claim anything approaching the same level of 
intellectual influence on the bench. Indeed, even jurists relatively favorably inclined towards 
protecting the public domain, such as Judge Kozinski and Justice Breyer, occasionally strain to 
find copyright infringement in dubious circumstances.382 Copyright law necessarily involves 
                                                                    
378 Cf. KEITH E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 33–35 (2012) (arguing that requiring less-developed nations to 
meet most-developed nations’ standards of IP protection results in overall global levels of protection that exceed the 
welfare-maximizing level); Gregory N. Mandel, Leveraging the International Economy of Intellectual Property, 75 
OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2014) (developing this insight principally from the perspective of patent policy). 
379 See supra note 116. 
380 See, e.g., supra notes 78–87 (noting that increasing the scope of the public domain will reduce the cost of 
creating future expressive works and spur additional creative output). 
381 Cf. supra notes 351–352 and accompanying text. 
382 Compare American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (majority opinion of 
Breyer, J.), with, e.g., Ira Steven Nathenson, Aereo’s Errors, 2 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 171 (2014); Matthew Sag, The 
Uncertain Scope of the Public Performance Right After American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc. (Dec. 19, 
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2529047; Sarah E. Claypool, Comment, Aereo, Unlicensed 
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balancing the interests of putative property owners against those of users of expressive works, of 
course, and it is not surprising that different decision-makers might strike the balance differently 
from one case to the next. Nevertheless, the absence of a critical mass of serving judges as well 
schooled in the body of literature on the public domain as Reagan-era appointees were in law-
and-economics literature may explain why the former body of scholarship has proven less 
influential with the courts. 
The antitrust revolution may reveal a good deal about the effect on policy of changes in 
the composition of the courts. For example, although only ten years elapsed between the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Schwinn and GTE Sylvania,383 only three of the Justices who 
decided Schwinn were still on the Court when GTE Sylvania overruled Schwinn.384 Although no 
one would suggest that the world needs more ideological litmus tests for prospective judicial 
nominees, it is quite clear that judges’ viewpoints matter to case outcomes. Efforts to encourage 
more awareness of the purpose and importance of the public domain among judges and 
prospective judges, accordingly, appear to represent a desirable step for would-be copyright 
reformers. 
VI. Conclusion 
A strong consensus exists among disinterested copyright experts that the structure of 
existing law excessively restricts the public domain and thereby disserves the public interest. 
Copyright legislation, treaty-making, and case law, however, have proven remarkably resistant to 
the insights developed in copyright scholarship on the public domain over the past quarter 
century. Comparing copyright history with the development of antitrust law reveals that there is 
                                                                    
Retransmissions, and Emerging Technologies: The Case for Congressional Action, 100 IOWA L. REV. — (2015, 
forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2490133; and compare Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258 
(9th Cir. 2014) (majority opinion of Kozinski, J.), with, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Ex Post Incentives and IP in Garcia v. 
Google and Beyond, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 37 (Aug. 20, 2014); Paul M. Azzi, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make A 
Copyright: The Dangerous Implication of Granting a Copyright in Performance Per Se, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 529 
(2014). The full Court of Appeals later rejected Judge Kozinski’s decision as an unwarranted expansion of the scope 
of copyright. Garcia v. Google Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740–44 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); cf. id. at 749–53 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
383 See supra notes 25, 48 and accompanying text. 
384 Justices William Brennan, Potter Stewart, and Byron White were members of both the Schwinn and GTE 
Sylvania Courts, although Justice White did not participate in the decision in Schwinn. The other two Justices 
articulated consistent positions in the two cases: Justice Brennan joined the Schwinn majority but dissented in GTE 
Sylvania, and Justice Stewart dissented in Schwinn but joined the majority in GTE Sylvania. 
In the intervening years, however, Chief Justice Warren Burger had replaced Chief Justice Earl Warren; Justice 
Harry Blackmun had replaced Justice Abe Fortas (who authored Schwinn); Justice John Paul Stevens had replaced 
Justice William O. Douglas; Justice Lewis F. Powell (who authored GTE Sylvania) had replaced Justice Hugo Black; 
Justice William Rehnquist had replaced the second Justice John Marshall Harlan; and Justice Thurgood Marshall 
had replaced Justice Tom C. Clark. 
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nothing inevitable about this state of affairs; that insights developed in legal scholarship can and 
do alter the content of substantive law.385 It is worthwhile to ask, therefore, what is different 
about copyright law; why the existing structure of the law seems to command so little regard 
from disinterested scholars whose professional careers revolve around studying copyright, and 
why lawmakers seem to exhibit dismissive attitudes toward the professional copyright literature. 
Why do so many of the participants in the copyright ecosystem appear to be talking past one 
another? The question lacks a single readily apparent answer, although perhaps some of the 
possible answers developed in the preceding section contain fractional portions of the truth. 
For legal scholars, recommendations are difficult to formulate. It would be tempting to 
conclude that the insularity of scholarly work is the underlying problem here and that scholars 
must engage more directly with courts and policymakers to have a hope of influencing 
substantive legal change. It is certainly true that the corpus of scholarly literature on the public 
domain canvassed above largely avoids addressing thorny “how” questions: how can society 
ensure that courts make better informed decisions; how can we influence Congress to look 
beyond the economic interests of the industries whose lobbyists work assiduously to curry their 
attention and favor when setting policy; how can scholars’ insights best be incorporated into 
substantive law. Some greater engagement with those sorts of issues might serve would-be 
copyright reformers’ long-term goals, even if they do not go as far as Professor Lessig and exit 
the field to focus full-time on campaign finance reform. 
On the other hand, scholars have good reasons to shy away from the messy endeavor of 
real-world policy-making and to treat such “how” questions as outside the purview of legal 
scholarship. Doing so helps assure readers of legal scholarship that scholars’ views are 
undistorted by personal bias or a stake in the outcome of the controversies on which they report. 
Some of the impartiality that I have suggested is important to well-reasoned decision-making is 
lost if scholars take too prominent a role in the political and judicial process. Drafting books, 
articles, and perhaps the occasional amicus brief is about as close to the process as a legal scholar 
can get without raising suspicions that one’s scholarship is a mere stalking horse for the interests 
of one’s clients. 
For governmental actors, it is a little easier to speak definitively. No one can make Chief 
Justice Roberts or Judge Edwards read a law review article if they don’t want to. Their decisions 
carry the same precedential force either way. Yet proudly trumpeting one’s disengagement from 
the corpus of professional literature in one’s own field is a poor way to inspire confidence as an 
informed and impartial decision-maker. Unless law is simply politics, then the views of 
disinterested experts deserve a fair hearing in any forum that aspires to correctness and 
legitimacy. The fact that courts and other policymakers have in fact relied on legal scholarship to 
                                                                    
385 One might equally well consider how the law of privacy (see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)), or trademark (see Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of 
Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927)), or many other substantive doctrines developed in response to 
legal scholars’ arguments. Antitrust supplies a recent, but hardly the only, illustration of this broader point. 
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undertake far-reaching transformative projects in the past shows, I hope, that law is not simply 
politics and that ideas matter. Judge Wisdom had it right: decision-makers need to engage with 
scholarship rather than ignore it. 
Whether or not one approves of the results, the reformist antitrust scholarship that 
emerged a half-century ago undeniably accomplished something tangible: it supplied the basis 
for wholesale judicial revision of antitrust doctrine to fit better with the scholarly consensus. 
Understanding why legal change does, or does not, occur in response to evolution in scholarly 
thinking is a worthwhile exercise for those interested in meaningful copyright reform in the 
public interest. What distinguishes successful law reform efforts from those that fail? When 
advocates of greater protections for the public domain develop a robust answer to that question, 
the benefits to the law and to the public interest will be substantial indeed. 
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